Advancing High-Speed Rail Policy in the United States, Research Report 11-18 by Ashiabor, Seananu & Wei, Wenbin
San Jose State University
SJSU ScholarWorks
Mineta Transportation Institute Publications
6-1-2012
Advancing High-Speed Rail Policy in the United
States, Research Report 11-18
Seananu Ashiabor
San Jose State University
Wenbin Wei
San Jose State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.sjsu.edu/mti_publications
Part of the Transportation Commons
This Report is brought to you for free and open access by SJSU ScholarWorks. It has been accepted for inclusion in Mineta Transportation Institute
Publications by an authorized administrator of SJSU ScholarWorks. For more information, please contact scholarworks@sjsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Seananu Ashiabor and Wenbin Wei. "Advancing High-Speed Rail Policy in the United States, Research Report 11-18" Mineta
Transportation Institute Publications (2012).
Advancing High-Speed Rail 
Policy in the United States
MTI Report 11-18
Funded by U.S. Department of 
Transportation and California 
Department of Transportation
M
T
I
A
dvancing H
igh-Speed R
ail Policy in the U
nited States
Report N
um
ber 11-18
M
ay 2012
The Norman Y. Mineta International Institute for Surface Transportation Policy Studies (MTI) was established by Congress as part 
of the Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991. Reauthorized in 1998, MTI was selected by the U.S. Department 
of Transportation through a competitive process in 2002 as a national “Center of Excellence.” The Institute is funded by Con-
gress through the United States Department of Transportation’s Research and Innovative Technology Administration, the Califor-
nia Legislature through the Department of Transportation (Caltrans), and by private grants and donations. 
The Institute receives oversight from an internationally respected Board of Trustees whose members represent all major surface 
transportation modes. MTI’s focus on policy and management resulted from a Board assessment of the industry’s unmet needs 
and led directly to the choice of the San José State University College of Business as the Institute’s home.  The Board provides 
policy direction, assists with needs assessment, and connects the Institute and its programs with the international transportation 
community. 
MTI’s transportation policy work is centered on three primary responsibilities: 
MINETA TRANSPORTATION INSTITUTE
Research 
MTI works to provide policy-oriented research for all levels of 
government and the private sector to foster the development 
of optimum surface transportation systems. Research areas 
include: transportation security; planning and policy develop-
ment; interrelationships among transportation, land use, and the 
environment; transportation finance; and collaborative labor-
management relations. Certified Research Associates conduct 
the research. Certification requires an advanced degree, gener-
ally a Ph.D., a record of academic publications, and professional 
references. Research projects culminate in a peer-reviewed 
publication, available both in hardcopy and on TransWeb, the 
MTI website (http://transweb.sjsu.edu). 
Education  
The educational goal of the Institute is to provide graduate-level 
education to students seeking a career in the development and 
operation of surface transportation programs. MTI, through San 
José State University, offers an AACSB-accredited Master of Sci-
ence in Transportation Management and a graduate Certificate 
in Transportation Management that serve to prepare the nation’s 
transportation managers for the 21st century. The master’s de-
gree is the highest conferred by the California State University 
system. With the active assistance of the California Department 
of Transportation, MTI delivers its classes over a state-of-
the-art videoconference network throughout the state 
of California and via webcasting beyond, allowing working 
transportation professionals to pursue an advanced degree 
regardless of their location. To meet the needs of employ-
ers seeking a diverse workforce, MTI’s education program 
promotes enrollment to under-represented groups. 
Information and Technology Transfer 
MTI promotes the availability of completed research to 
professional organizations and journals and works to 
integrate the research findings into the graduate education 
program. In addition to publishing the studies, the Institute 
also sponsors symposia to disseminate research results to 
transportation professionals and encourages Research As-
sociates to present their findings at conferences. The World 
in Motion, MTI’s quarterly newsletter, covers innovation 
in the Institute’s research and education programs. MTI’s 
extensive collection of transportation-related publications 
is integrated into San José State University’s world-class 
Martin Luther King, Jr. Library. 
The contents of this report reflect the views of the authors, who are responsible for the facts and accuracy of the information presented here-
in. This document is disseminated under the sponsorship of the U.S. Department of Transportation, University Transportation Centers Program 
and the California Department of Transportation, in the interest of information exchange. This report does not necessarily reflect the official 
views or policies of the U.S. government, State of California, or the Mineta Transportation Institute, who assume no liability for the contents or 
use thereof. This report does not constitute a standard specification, design standard, or regulation. The views and conclusions contained in this 
document are those of the authors and should not be interpreted as necessarily representing the official policies, either expressed or implied, 
of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.
DISCLAIMER
MTI FOUNDER 
Hon. Norman Y. Mineta
MTI BOARD OF TRUSTEES
Honorary Co-Chair
Hon. James Oberstar **
Chair
House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee
House of Representatives
Washington, DC
Honorary Co-Chair
Hon. John L. Mica **
Ranking Member
House Transportation and
Infrastructure Committee
House of Representatives
Washington, DC
David L. Turney *
Chair/President/CEO
Digital Recorders, Inc.
Dallas, TX
William W. Millar ^
Vice Chair/President
American Public Transportation
Association (APTA)
Washington, DC
Hon. Rod Diridon, Sr. #
Executive Director
Mineta Transportation Institute
San Jose, CA
Ronald Barnes
General Manager
Veolia Transportation/East
Valley RPTA
Mesa, AZ
Rebecca Brewster
President/COO
American Transportation
Research Institute
Smyrna, GA
Donald H. Camph
President
California Institute for 
Technology Exchange
Los Angeles, CA
Anne P. Canby
President
Surface Transportation
Policy Project
Washington, DC
Jane Chmielinski
President
DMJM Harris
New York, NY
William Dorey
President/CEO
Granite Construction, Inc.
Watsonville, CA
Mortimer Downey
Chairman
PB Consult Inc.
Washington, DC
Nuria Fernandez
Commissioner
City of Chicago,
Department of Aviation,
Chicago, IL
Steve Heminger
Executive Director
Metropolitan Transportation
Commission
Oakland, CA
Hon. John Horsley #
Executive Director
American Association of State
Highway & Transportation
Officials (AASHTO)
Washington, DC
Joseph Boardman
President/CEO
Amtrak
60 Massachusetts Ave., N.E.
Washington, DC 20002
Will Kempton
Director
California Department of 
Transportation
Sacramento, CA
Brian Macleod
Senior Vice President
Gillig Corporation
Hayward, CA
Dr. Bruce Magid
Dean
College of Business
San José State University
San José, CA
Stephanie Pinson
President/COO
Gilbert Tweed Associates, Inc.
New York, NY
Hans Rat
Secretary General
Union Internationale des
Transports Publics
Bruxelles, Belgium
Vickie Shaffer
General Manager
Tri-State Transit Authority
Huntington, WV
Paul Toliver #
President
New Age Industries
Seattle, WA
Michael S. Townes #
President/CEO
Transportation District
Commission of Hampton Roads
Hampton,  VA
Edward Wytkind
President
Transportation Trades
Department, AFL-CIO
Washington, DC
Hon. Rod Diridon, Sr.
Executive Director
Karen E. Philbrick, Ph.D.
Research Director
Peter Haas, Ph.D.
Education Director
Donna Maurillo
Communications Director 
 
Brian Michael Jenkins
National Transportation Security Center of 
Excellence 
 
Asha Weinstein Agrawal, Ph.D.
National Transportation Finance Center
Asha Weinstein Agrawal, Ph.D.
Urban and Regional Planning 
San José State University
Jan Botha, Ph.D.
Civil & Environmental Engineering
San José State University
 
Katherine Kao Cushing, Ph.D.
Enviromental Science 
San José State University 
 
Dave Czerwinski, Ph.D.
Marketing and Decision Science 
San José State University
 
Frances Edwards, Ph.D.
Political Science 
San José State University
 
Taeho Park, Ph.D.
Organization and Management 
San José State University
Diana Wu
Martin Luther King, Jr. Library
San José State University
Directors Research Associates Policy Oversight Committee
**     Honorary
*   Chair
^    Vice Chair
#    Past Chair
A publication of
Mineta Transportation Institute
Created by Congress in 1991
College of Business
San José State University
San José, CA 95192-0219
REPORT 11-18
ADVANCING HIGH-SPEED RAIL POLICY IN THE UNITED STATES
Senanu Ashiabor, Ph.D.
Wenbin Wei, Ph.D.
June 2012
TECHNICAL REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE
1. Report No. 2. Government Acession No. 3. Recipient’s Catalog No.
4. Title and Subtitle 5. Report Date
6. Performing Organization Code
7. Authors 8. Performing Organization Report
9. Performing Organization Name and Address 10. Work Unit No.
11. Contract or Grant No.
12. Sponsoring Agency Name and Address 13. Type of Report and Period Covered
14. Sponsoring Agency Code
15. Supplemental Notes
16. Abstract
17. Key Words 18. Distribution Statement
19. Security Classif. (of this report) 20. Security Classif. (of this page) 21. No. of Pages 22. Price
Form DOT F 1700.7 (8-72)
72
CA-MTI-12-2905
Advancing High-Speed Rail Policy in the United States June 2012
MTI Report 11-18Senanu Ashiabor, Ph.D. and Wenbin Wei, Ph.D.
Mineta Transportation Institute 
College of Business 
San José State University 
San José, CA 95192-0219
California Department of Transportation
Office of Research—MS42
P.O. Box 942873
Sacramento, CA 94273-0001
U.S. Department of Transportation
Research & Innovative Technology Admin.
1200 New Jersey Avenue, SE
Washington, DC 20590
Final Report
 
UnclassifiedUnclassified
No restrictions. This document is available to the public through 
The National Technical Information Service, Springfield, VA 22161
DTRT07-G-0054
$15.00
High speed rail; Railway; 
Development; Policy framework;  
Legislation
This report builds on a review of international experience with high-speed rail projects to develop recommendations for a High-
speed rail policy framework for the United States. The international review looked at the experience of Korea, Taiwan, China, 
and several countries in Europe. Countries in Asia and Europe have pursued high-speed rail (HSR) to achieve various goals, 
which include relieving congestion on highway networks, freeing up capacity on rail network for freight train operations, and 
reducing travel time for travelers. Some of the key rationales do not work well in the US context. As an example, in the US, freight 
companies own most of the rail network and, hence, do not need government intervention to free up capacity for their operations.
We concluded that the potential to reduce travel times, coupled with improved travel time reliability and safety, will be the 
strongest selling points for HSR in the US. HSR lines work best in high-density, economically active corridors. Given that there 
are a limited number of such corridors in the US, this study recommends that the US HSR project funding mix be skewed heavily 
toward state bonds guaranteed by the federal government. This will ensure that the states that benefit directly from the projects 
pay most of the costs, making it more palatable to states that may not have HSR projects. For the projects that span multiple 
states, member states may have to negotiate the level of financial responsibility they will bear, and this will require detailed 
negotiations and financial setups that are not addressed in this report. 
Other measures that the federal government needs to put in place include designating a key agency and dedicated funding 
source, and developing regulations and specifications for HSR design and construction. States that embark on HSR projects 
should start with formal legislation and put in place structures to ensure sustained political support throughout the planning and 
construction of the project. The federal government also needs to move quickly to foster educational and training centers to build 
up the HSR workforce in the country.
To order this publication, please contact:
Mineta Transportation Institute 
College of Business 
San José State University 
San José, CA 95192-0219
Tel: (408) 924-7560 
Fax: (408) 924-7565 
Email: mineta-institute@sjsu.edu 
transweb.sjsu.edu
by Mineta Transportation Institute 
All rights reserved
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number: 
Copyright © 2012
2009943697
061812
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
iv  
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
v
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This report would not have been complete without the cooperation of the various people 
we interviewed during the study. Dr. Allison Cerreño, shared her perspective on the state 
of high-speed rail projects in the US based on past studies she had conducted for MTI on 
the subject. Nazih Haddad from the Florida High Speed Rail Authority also provided es-
sential information while working on the Tampa-Orlando Florida high-speed rail line. Doc 
Dockery’s extensive knowledge of the history, hurdles and numerous twists and turns 
through which the Florida High Speed project had to maneuver was very enlightening.
Rod Diridon, Sr., MTI Executive Director, willingly shared his experience from serving on 
the California High-Speed Rail Authority and provided us initial contacts to members of the 
Authority. We are thankful to members of the California High-Speed Rail Authority for tak-
ing time out of their busy schedules to discuss the structure of the Authority and steps they 
were taking to keep the project on track.
We are thankful for the input of Zheng Fan a masters degree student in Engineering and 
Management at San Jose State University during the study. Zheng Fan assisted in con-
ducting the literature review for this study.
We are very grateful for the support and assistance provided by staff of the Mineta 
Transportation Institute (MTI) during the study. Thanks to Meg Fitts, MTI Research Support 
Manager during most of the study, for assisting us in navigating various administrative 
hurdles. We want to thank Dr. Karen Philbrick, MTI Deputy Executive Director and Director 
of Research, for her patience and support during the study, and we are especially thankful 
for her prompt response to our requests. 
The authors also thank MTI Director of Communications and Technology Transfer Donna 
Maurillo; Student Publications Assistant Sahil Rahimi; Student Research Support Assistant 
Joey Mercado; and Webmaster Frances Cherman, who also provided editorial assistance.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
vi Acknowledgments
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
vii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Executive Summary 1
I. Introduction 3
II. Current State of US High-Speed Rail 5
Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors 5
Funding for High-Speed Rail 8
High-Speed Rail Policy 12
III. International High-Speed Rail Development 15
Japan: A World Leader 15
Taiwan and Korea: Privatization versus Public Funding 19
China: Using High-Speed Rail to Drive Development 21
Europe: Building Up an Interconnected High-Speed Rail Network 24
IV. Toward a More Coherent US High-Speed Rail Policy Framework 29
Making the Case for High-Speed Rail in the US 29
Leadership Challenge 31
Sustained Funding for High-Speed Rail 32
V. Conclusions 35
VI. Recommendations 37
Federal Role 37
State Role 39
Future of the Industry 39
Appendix A: White Paper on California High-Speed Rail Project 41
Introduction 41
US High-Speed Rail Projects 41
California High-Speed Rail Case Study 46
Successful Strategies 51
Conclusion 52
Abbreviations and Acronyms 55
Endnotes 57
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
viii Table of Contents
Bibliography 63
About the Authors 69
Peer Review 71
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
ix
LIST OF FIGURES
1. Historical Timeline of Major High-Speed Rail Legislation in the United States 5
2. Spatial Locations of Proposed US High-Speed Rail Corridors 6
3. Breakdown of Federal HSR Funding by State HSR Projects in 2010 11
4. Main Lines in China’s High-Speed Rail Network 23
5. France National High-Speed Rail Network 25
6. High-Speed Rail Network in Europe in 2010  28
7. White Paper: Breakdown of Federal HSR Funding by State HSR Projects 
   in 2010 46
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
x List of Figures
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
xi
LIST OF TABLES
1. Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors 7
2. Initial Funding for US High-Speed Rail Corridors  9
3. Disbursement of ARRA and High-Speed Rail Funds in 2009/10 10
4. Cost per Mile of Shinkansen Systems 18
5. Monthly Revenue from Taiwan’s High-Speed Rail System 20
6. White Paper: Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors 44
7. White Paper: Initial Funding for US High-Speed Rail Corridors  45
8. White Paper: Disbursement of ARRA and High-Speed Rail Funds in 2009/10 47
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
xii List of Tables
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
1
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This report looks at the current state of high-speed rail (HSR) policy in the US, juxtaposing 
it against international HSR experience in Asia and Europe. The aim is to identify basic 
steps that need to be put in place if an HSR system is to be developed in the US. The 
international review showed that countries implementing HSR had a few key, focused 
reasons for developing their HSR systems. Korea and Taiwan viewed HSR as a means 
to relieve congestion on both their conventional rail and road networks. Europe has used 
HSR to relieve congestion on its conventional rail lines by providing additional capacity 
with improved quality of service and, in some cases, to spur economic development. China 
is using HSR to spur economic development, and free up capacity in its rail network for 
freight trains.
The US, on the other hand, seems to be struggling to justify the need for HSR. Public 
statements of the current president, his vice president (an avid train enthusiast), and 
the secretary of transportation indicate the executive branch believes HSR needs to 
be integrated into the mix of transportation options for the US going forward. However, 
some of the key rationales for HSR in Europe and Asia do not make a strong case in 
the US situation. For example, highway congestion for intercity travel is not at critical 
levels because of the well-developed, limited-access interstate highway system. Also, a 
rail ownership structure in which freight companies own most of the rail network in the 
US means there is no pressing need for government to intervene to free up capacity for 
freight operations, though there is a need, in some cases, to provide more capacity for joint 
operation of freight and conventional passenger trains.
The extensive development of the interstate highway network and airports makes it harder 
to justify additional investment in HSR in the US. The fact that several states in the US 
do not have the high-density, economically active population corridors along which HSR 
systems are successful makes it politically challenging to generate support at the federal 
level for funding of HSR lines.
Though congestion levels on intercity highways are not at unbearable levels most 
legislators know additional capacity will be needed to support the increased demand 
generated by population growth in the future. HSR will be one of the key options on the 
table for addressing this need. We believe one of the reasons the US continues to lack a 
firm HSR policy framework is that advocates have not developed a few key, compelling 
arguments that politicians can coalesce behind to push for HSR development. In our view 
on-time reliability, improved speeds (shorter travel times), and relatively greater safety of 
HSR compared to other modes of travel are the strongest selling points for HSR in the US. 
Other benefits of HSR that have been promoted in literature but are not fully addressed 
in this report include reduced energy use, emissions, and congestion vs. other modes of 
travel, and the potential to spur urban regeneration and attract commercial development 
in the station areas.
HSR should be funded using a mix of grants, loans and bonds, with the mix heavily 
skewed towards bonds. The bonds should be state sponsored but guaranteed by the 
federal government. The benefit of using state bonds is that the states that benefit most 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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from HSR pay for it, making it more palatable to states that do not have HSR projects. In 
addition, state bonds lighten the burden on current taxpayers and equitably assign the 
greatest share of the cost to those who will benefit most: future generations.
At the federal level, a key agency needs to be designated. Though Amtrak appears to 
be advocating for that role, the Federal Railroad Administration appears to be the best 
suited to manage an HSR program, especially as it is likely to be federally funded. A 
dedicated funding source is needed so private capital and stakeholders can commit to 
the HSR program. Federal government needs to move quickly to develop regulations and 
specifications for HSR design and construction, as the different performance characteristics 
make them incompatible with the current specifications for rail in the US.
States also have a role to play. Given the massive amount of investment involved, most 
HSR projects will need some form of political support. States must have a well-thought-
out plan and a dedicated position (or body) that will work with the various legislative and 
political arms of government to build and sustain support for their projects through the 
development and construction phase. A team that can work closely with legislators will 
help avoid the rollercoaster rides other state projects have experienced. States that decide 
to embark on HSR should make sure there is formal legislation in place. States should 
incorporate private-public partnerships into their development plans as early as possible.
A huge issue facing the nascent HSR industry is the lack of HSR expertise in the US. 
The Mineta Transportation Institute – in collaboration with the California High-Speed Rail 
Authority, the California State University system, and several private and public agencies 
– has begun work on the issue. The federal government needs to quickly begin to focus 
on developing educational and training centers to build up the HSR workforce capacity in 
the US.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The United States has had a long-running interest in high-speed rail (HSR). A year 
after Japan launched its now-famous Shinkansen bullet train in 1964, the US Congress 
authorized $90 million under the High Speed Ground Transportation Act to develop and 
demonstrate HSR technologies.1 Europe and several countries in Asia followed Japan’s 
lead and introduced their own HSR trains in the 1980s. Europe now has more than five 
thousand miles of HSR lines, while Asia has more than six thousand. By contrast, the 
closest the US has to an HSR project (by the end of 2011) is Amtrak’s Northeast corridor 
Acela Express – a high-speed train running on rail tracks that restrict the train’s 150-miles-
per-hour maximum speed to an average of about 84 miles per hour.
The current Administration has aggressively advocated for HSR in the US. President 
Obama repeatedly raised the issue during his 2008 Presidential election campaign. After 
entering office, he was quick to set aside $8 billion for HSR in the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act2 (ARRA) that was passed during the economic recession in 2009.
The $8 billion commitment may appear to be a drop in the bucket when one considers 
the estimate of more than $500 billion3 that may be needed to build out the ten federally 
designated HSR corridors in the US. However, the $8 billion is significant, given it is 
the only explicit and dedicated funding for construction of actual HSR to date. Prior to 
that, the only HSR-related funding was $5 million set aside in the Intermodal Surface 
Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA)4 for projects to eliminate hazards at railway-
highway crossings.
Though the current steps appear laudable, to date the US has no clear-cut policy on HSR 
development. Current efforts are very ad hoc at both the federal and state levels and lack 
clearly defined goals. Given that HSR projects are multibillion-dollar initiatives that require 
substantial lead times from planning through completion, a more structured and long-term 
policy framework with clearly defined goals and a stable source of funding is needed.
This report looks at the current state of US HSR policy against the backdrop of international 
HSR experience, mainly in Asia and Europe. The focus of this report is not to address the 
question of whether or not HSR is needed in the US; much has been published on both 
sides of that issue, and that debate that will continue even if HSR projects are built. The 
focus is rather on what needs to be done if HSR is to succeed in the US.
The aim is to identify some of the basic structures that need to be put in place in developing 
an HSR system for the US. The next chapter is a review of existing US HSR projects. 
Chapter III reviews HSR projects on the international front, mainly Europe and Asia. The 
review identifies motivations for development of HSR projects in those countries, measures 
put in place to ensure the projects were successful, and costs and benefits derived from 
implementing HSR. Chapter III looks at the broad lessons from the international experience. 
Chapter IV and V use the findings as a basis for outlining policies and strategies the 
US government should pursue to build a more solid HSR policy framework. We provide 
specific recommendations and identify areas where further research is needed to develop 
US HSR policy.
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II. CURRENT STATE OF US HIGH-SPEED RAIL
Even though there is still a vigorous ongoing public debate about whether HSR is right 
for the US, from public statements made by the current president, his vice president 
(an avid train enthusiast), and the secretary of transportation, the stance of the current 
administration is clear: It has decided it is necessary to integrate HSR into the mix of 
transportation options for the US going forward.
This decision comes on the heels of a long trail of legislation. In 1965, Congress passed 
the High Speed Ground Transportation Act, authorizing $90 million to develop and 
demonstrate HSR technologies.5 Five years later, in 1970, President Nixon signed the 
Passenger Rail Service Act, which created the National Rail Passenger Corporation 
(Amtrak). One of Amtrak’s key roles was to take over intercity passenger rail service from 
freight rail companies, which found it unprofitable.6 
One of the routes to which Amtrak devoted substantial resources was the northeast corridor 
(NEC), from Washington, DC to Boston. According to the Federal Railroad Administration, 
by 1997 Amtrak had spent up to $3.3 billion on improvements to the northeast corridor. In 
November 2000, Amtrak finally rolled out their Acela Express trains, with an inaugural trip 
from Washington, DC to Boston. The Acela train is the closet the US has to a functioning 
HSR. A timeline of the major HSR legislation since 1965 is shown in Figure 1.
FEDERALLY DESIGNATED HIGH-SPEED RAIL CORRIDORS
Section 1010 of the 1991 ISTEA  Act7 set aside $5 million annually for elimination of hazards 
at railway-highway crossings at five high-speed railway corridors, to be designated by the 
Secretary of Transportation. The Act defined high-speed rail corridors as locations where 
trains could attain maximum speeds of 90 miles per hour, or greater. The first five HSR 
corridors were designated as a result of stipulations included in the Surface Transportation 
Efficiency Acts.
Later, in June 1998, six additional corridors were authorized under the Transportation 
Equity Act for the 21st Century (TEA-21)8 leading to the current eleven designated US 
HSR corridors. A list of the eleven corridors designated by the secretary of transportation, 
along with their descriptions, is shown in Table 1. Figure 2 shows the spatial location of the 
HSR corridors.
 
Figure 1. Historical Timeline of Major High-Speed Rail Legislation in the United 
States
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Until recently, the Northeast Corridor, where the Acela Express operates, was not 
considered a federally designated corridor, as it was funded separately under various 
legislative instruments, including Northeast Corridor Improvement Project.9 In March 2011 
US Transportation Secretary Ray LaHood designated it as an HSR corridor. The Secretary 
also extended the scope of the California corridor to Las Vegas, Nevada, in July 2009.
Figure 2. Spatial Locations of Proposed US High-Speed Rail Corridors
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
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Table 1. Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors
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Chicago 
Hub 
Network
Initially designated on October 15, 1992 as the Midwest corridor, it consisted of three 
spokes emanating from Chicago, IL, westward to Milwaukee, WI, east to Detroit, MI, 
and south to St. Louis, MO. In December 1998, the Milwaukee link was extended to 
Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN and a new spoke to Indianapolis, IN and Cincinnati, OH 
was added. The Indianapolis/Cincinnati link has been extended through Ohio in a 
closed loop running from Cincinnati to Columbus, Cleveland, and Toledo and back to 
Chicago. The Indianapolis link has also been extended to Louisville, KY.
Florida 
Corridor
Initially designated on October 16, 1992, runs from Miami in the south to Orlando and 
westward to Tampa.
California 
Corridor
Also designated October 19, 1992. Runs mainly north-south along the state, linking 
the major metropolitan areas of San Diego, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area 
and Sacramento via the San Joaquin Valley. On July 2, 2009, US Transportation 
Secretary Ray LaHood announced extension of the California high-speed rail 
corridor to Las Vegas, Nevada.
Southeast 
Corridor
Designated in October 2000 as a link between Charlotte NC, Richmond, VA, and 
Washington, DC. In December 1995, it was extended all the way to Macon, GA, 
passing through Greenville, SC, and Atlanta, GA. The Richmond link was also ex-
tended to Hampton Roads, VA. In December 1998, the Macon, GA, loop – passing 
through Jacksonville, FL, Savannah, GA, and Columbia, SC back to Raleigh, SC – 
was closed. The Southeast corridor in its final form in 1998 is better characterized 
as a network. The corridor now covers six states: Florida, Georgia, South and North 
Carolina, Virginia and Washington, DC.
Pacific 
Northwest 
Corridor
Designated in October 1992. Links Eugene, OR, to Vancouver, BC, Canada, passing 
through Portland, OR, and Seattle, WA, on the way north. The corridor is 466 miles 
long. 
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Gulf Coast 
Corridor
Designated November 18, 1998. Another of the multi-state corridors, it traverses six 
states: Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and New Orleans. There are 
three legs originating from New Orleans, LA. The westward leg goes to Houston, TX, 
the eastbound leg to Mobile, AL, with an intermediate stop in Biloxi, MS, and a third 
leg runs northeast to Atlanta, with major stations in Meridian, MS, and Birmingham, 
AL.
Keystone 
Corridor
Designated in December 1998. A planned, multi-state corridor with the west/east link 
from Pittsburg, PA through Harrisburg to Philadelphia. The north/south link starts in 
Washington, DC, and runs through Baltimore, MD, Wilmington, DE, Philadelphia, PA, 
Trenton and Newark, NJ, and ends in New York. 
Empire 
State 
Corridor
Designated in December 1998. Planned to run from west to east end of New York 
State, Buffalo to New York City, with stops in Rochester, Syracuse, Utica and Albany.
Northern 
New 
England 
Corridor
Set up to connect Boston to various states in the Northwest. Boston, MA, is the 
center, with connections to Portland/Auburn, VT, and Montreal, PQ Canada, Albany, 
CT and New Haven, CT.
South 
Central 
Corridor
Designated in 2000, it is another of the multi-state corridors. The Texas link is from 
San Antonio, TX, in the south, to Dallas-Ft. Worth in the north. Dallas Ft.-Worth is 
then linked to Tulsa, OK and Little Rock, AK.
 
North-East 
Corridor
In March 2012, the Transportation Secretary officially designated the existing 
Northeast Corridor, from Washington, DC, to Boston, MA, a high-speed rail corridor.
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FUNDING FOR HIGH-SPEED RAIL
Despite ISTEA and earlier acts designating high-speed rail corridors, the acts did 
not appropriate any funds for constructing HSR lines on the corridors. So, while the 
transportation secretary was enthusiastically designating HSR corridors until 2008, the 
only funding available was tied to improving safety at locations where trains crossed 
highways at high speeds. The ARRA is the first time the federal government committed a 
substantial amount of public funds for the construction of HSR projects in the US.
The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA) under the US Department of Transportation 
was in charge of disbursing the ARRA HSR funds. The FRA initially disbursed the bulk 
of ARRA funds to six major corridors as shown in Table 2. At the time ARRA was set up, 
in 2008, California appeared to be the only state with a potentially viable HSR line after 
voters endorsed a $9.95 billion state bond to fund the California High-Speed Rail Project. 
The projects of the remaining states were slowly grinding to a halt due to an absence of 
funding.
Interestingly, when the first round of ARRA funds was allocated, Florida raced past 
California with an allocation of $1.25 billion, and, soon after, additional funds, bringing 
the total to $2.4 billion. The $2.4 billion would have covered 99 percent of the estimated 
construction cost for the Tampa-Orlando HSR line.
Later, the governors of Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin returned their ARRA funding saying 
it represented wasteful federal government spending. The secretary of transportation 
reallocated the funds to other projects. After the reallocation, Florida’s HSR, which appeared 
to be the most promising HSR project, came to a screeching halt. Once again, California 
ended up with the bulk of more than $3 billion in federal funds for HSR projects in the US.
As of the writing of this report (2010), only $5.8 billion dollars of the ARRA funds have 
been obligated. Table 3 lists both ARRA and other federal rail-related funds (those that 
can be used for high-speed-rail-related projects) that have been allocated to states at the 
beginning of July 2011.*
*Assembled from data on the FRA website.
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Table 3. Disbursement of ARRA and High-Speed Rail Funds in 2009/10 
State Description ARRA FY09 FY10 Planning FY10 SDP Grand Total
CA California High-Speed Rail + Other State Projects 2,908,371,742  6,400,000  116,000,000 3,030,771,742 
IL
Chicago to St. Louis: 2010 
Early Construction Projects, 
Englewood Flyover
1,268,310,998  1,250,000   1,269,560,998 
WA
Pacific Northwest Corridor: 
Service Block 2-SEA-PDX 6 
RTs- ARRA Redistributed
 735,458,912     735,458,912 
NC Piedmont/Charlotte/Raleigh  520,000,000    22,000,000  542,000,000 
MD BWI Airport Station Improvements  69,400,000     69,400,000 
FL
Tampa to Orlando: 
Program Management and 
Preliminary Engineering
 66,660,000     66,660,000 
VT
Vermonter New England 
Central Railroad Route 
Improvements
 50,000,000  500,000    50,500,000 
CT New Haven to Hartford to Springfield Corridor  40,000,000     40,000,000 
ME Several projects  38,385,495   600,000   38,985,495 
NJ Portal Bridge  38,500,000     38,500,000 
WI Milwaukee to Madison Corridor  30,000,000     30,000,000 
NY Empire Corridor + Rochester Station  5,545,733  1,000,000    6,545,733 
OR Pacific Northwest Corridor: Union Station Roof  5,900,000     5,900,000 
DC Union Station Access Improvements   4,270,500    4,270,500 
MO Missouri State Rail Plan + additional projects  3,338,800   500,000   3,838,800 
MI Chicago to Detroit  3,620,552     3,620,552 
CO Colorado State Rail Plan + Denver Interregional Study   1,400,000    1,400,000 
WV West Virginia HSIPR Planning   1,000,000    1,000,000 
GA Various Studies   750,000    750,000 
PA Keystone Corridor: Keystone West   750,000    750,000 
DE Delaware Intercity Rail Connection   450,000    450,000 
KS Kansas Service Development Plan (SDP)   250,000    250,000 
NM New Mexico State Rail Plan   100,000    100,000 
Grand Total 5,783,492,232  8,120,500  1,100,000  38,000,000 5,940,712,732 
Note: FYO9 Fiscal Year 2009.
         FY10 Fiscal Year 2010.
         FY10 SPD Fiscal Year 2010 Service Development Program.
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The back-and-forth between the states and the federal government on ARRA funds 
indicates the federal government has not arrived at a clear plan for growing the US HSR 
industry. A recent report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) points out that 
FRA had been mainly concerned with rail safety until it was suddenly given the task of 
disbursing ARRA funds and drawing up a national HSR plan on short notice. The report 
gives FRA credit for handling the situation but notes that it was understaffed. The FRA 
HSR office had only 23 staff members. It had to hire additional staff and also pull staff from 
other DOT projects to handle the workload.
- 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000
California
Washington
NorthEast Corridor
Mid-West
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Vermont
Maine
Wisconsin
Texas
Oregon
Nebraska
Missouri
West Virginia
Delaware
New Mexico
Federal Funding (US$ Millions)
Figure 3. Breakdown of Federal HSR Funding by State HSR Projects in 2010
In fact, if additional funds are set aside for HSR, the agency is in the unenviable position 
of having to staff up and manage several multibillion-dollar projects in several states and 
a technology with which it has limited experience.
Despite these challenges, the GAO continues to support the initiative of developing 
HSR in the US. In their review of how ARRA HSR funding was disbursed the GAO wrote 
“In summary, we found that while the potential benefits of high-speed rail projects are 
many, these projects—both here and abroad—are costly, take years to develop and 
build, and require substantial up-front public investment, as well as potentially long-term 
operating subsidies. Determining which, if any, high-speed rail projects may eventually 
be economically viable will rest on factors such as ridership potential, costs, and public 
benefits.” 
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HIGH-SPEED RAIL POLICY
Over the period during which the HSR corridors were designated, the GAO continued to 
emphasize the need for dedicated HSR funding,10 leadership, clearly defined goals and 
structural framework11 if HSR is to be implemented as a feasible transportation alternative 
in the United States. In a 2009 report to Congress the GAO noted the need to:
• Develop a written strategic vision for high-speed rail, particularly in relation to the 
role high-speed rail systems can play in the national transportation system, clearly 
identifying potential objectives and goals for high-speed rail systems and the roles 
federal and other stakeholders should play in achieving each objective and goal.
• Develop specific policies and procedures for reviewing and evaluating grant 
applications under the high-speed rail provisions of PRIIA*12 that clearly identify the 
outcomes expected from the award of grant funds and include performance and 
accountability measures.
• Develop guidance and methods for ensuring reliability of ridership and other 
forecasts used to determine the viability of high-speed rail projects and support 
the need for federal grant assistance. The methods could include such things 
as independent, third-party reviews of applicable ridership and other forecasts, 
identifying and implementing ways to structure incentives to improve the precision 
of ridership and cost estimates received from grant applicants, or other methods 
that can help improve the reliability of such forecasts.
The report also noted that “the infusion of up to $8 billion in Recovery Act funds is only 
a first step in developing potentially viable high-speed passenger rail projects. Several 
issues that have hampered development of these projects remain and will need to be 
resolved to effectively spend Recovery Act funds. Surmounting these challenges will 
require federal, state, and other stakeholder leadership to champion the development of 
economically viable high-speed corridors and the political will to carry them out. It will 
also require clear, specific policies and delineations of expected outcomes, and objective, 
realistic analysis of ridership, costs and other factors to determine the viability of projects 
and their transportation impact.”
Several policy issues including those highlighted below continue to handicap the 
development of HSR at the federal level in the US:
•	 There is no clearly articulated US HSR policy framework at the federal level. 
The “Preliminary National Rail Plan”13 developed as part of PRIIA broadly discusses 
high-speed rail and its potential, and summarizes the results from outreach surveys 
that were conducted with various stakeholders. It falls short on specifics and does 
not set forth any real “plan”. Another federal document, the “Vision for High-speed 
Rail in America”14 lays out the anticipated plans for developing HSR in the US. It 
is, however, narrowly focused on how funds from recent legislation like PRIIA and 
* Passenger Rail Investment and Improvement Act of 2008 (PRIIA): Reauthorizes Amtrak and tasks 
   Amtrak, US DOT, FRA, states, and other stakeholders to improve intercity passenger rail and work 
   toward the development of high-speed rail corridors.
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ARRA will be used to start up HSR development in the US. It has no clear long-
term policy or framework beyond PRIIA and ARRA. As the GAO has noted, for 
the government to succeed in the development of both intercity passenger rail and 
HSR it needs a plan that, at minimum, describes a) how intercity passenger rail fits 
into the national transportation system, b) defines the vision and goals for HSR in 
the country and within that context, c) clarifies the federal role in achieving these 
goals.15 Also, most states do not have a documented rail plan, and this will hamper 
the development of HSR, as there is no policy on how the existing rail systems will 
interact with HSR.
•	 The lead agency (FRA) is not positioned to handle HSR development. Amtrak 
was created to take over operation and development of intercity passenger rail in 
the US from freight operators, while FRA has been responsible for regulating safety 
of both passenger and freight rail operations as well as overseeing rail transport 
policy within the national framework. Though FRA developed the first US HSR 
project (NECIP), this was eventually transferred to Amtrak for completion. Since 
FRA was later tasked with distributing ARRA funds, it seems likely that it will be 
lead agency in charge of HSR development. Also PRIIA tasked FRA, not Amtrak, 
to develop the National Rail Plan and assist states in developing state rail plans 
because the state plans involve freight as well as passenger issues and because 
Amtrak is an operating entity, not a policy agency. The federal government needs 
to come out clearly on this issue and staff the FRA-HSR office accordingly. The 
agency had to request support staff from other DOT agencies to handle the ARRA 
fund applications and is ramping up its passenger rail staff from 23 to 46. Though 
laudable, these staffing adjustments cannot transform it from a rail safely regulatory 
agency to one managing multiple multibillion-dollar construction projects.
•	 There is no functional legislation guiding the development of HSR. Though 
ISTEA provided for designation of HSR corridors and PRIIA mandates the 
development of a National Rail Plan, both legislations are very broad and do not 
provide much specificity. For example PRIIA required funding be provided to only 
states that had state rail plans but there are no defined criteria for what should be in a 
state rail plan. Neither PRIIA nor ARRA provides a comprehensive framework within 
which HSR could operate. Until Congress buys fully into the current administration’s 
push for HSR, it is unlikely the legislative gap will be bridged in the near future. This 
will create challenges for HSR development in the US.
•	 There is no reliable source of funding for HSR. The former ARRA funding was a 
boon to the HSR industry, but it was ad hoc and was passed by Congress as part 
of an economic stimulus package, not because of a decision by the legislature to 
support HSR development. Follow-up legislation such as Hon. James Oberstar’s* 
$50 billion proposal for high-speed rail in 201016 did not make it through the 
legislative maze, encountering strong opposition from Republicans responding to 
pressure from the Tea Party movement to push for cutbacks in government size and 
spending.17 The governors from Wisconsin and Ohio returned HSR-ARRA funds in 
the midst of a recession. Both governors had campaigned against high-speed rail 
* Honorable James Oberstar was Chairman of the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure 
   from 2007 to 2011. 
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funding and wanted to divert the funds to other transportation (road and freight) 
projects. The transportation secretary, however, refused and reallocated their funds 
to other states, noting the ARRA law does not allow HSR funds to be used for 
other transportation modes. The Tea Party has been very vocal in their opposition 
for HSR, and both of these governors came into power with strong support from 
the movement. North Carolina also recently passed a law barring the state from 
accepting any additional federal HSR funds. Without a stable and reliable source of 
funding, the HSR initiative will not succeed in the US. It is not farfetched to imagine 
a scenario where a new administration could abandon the decision to build HSR 
altogether.
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This section provides a survey of HSR developments in Asia and Europe. It looks at the 
motivation for adoption of HSR, development costs, level of patronage of the system, 
revenue generated and profitability of selected projects. The aim is to provide a context to 
discuss the potential pathways HSR implementation could take in the United States.
JAPAN: A WORLD LEADER
No discussion of HSR is complete without a mention of Japan, the first to develop a 
commercial high-speed rail train and a leading nation in HSR railway technology worldwide. 
Built in 1964, Japan’s Tokyo-to-Osaka high-speed rail line was the first, and is still the 
busiest, high-speed rail line in the world. The line is usually referred to as the Tokaido 
Shinkansen. Tokaido is the name of the Tokyo-Osaka corridor and Shinkansen means 
“new trunk line” (referring to its status as the world’s first).
Motivation and Development of HSR System
In 1939, the Japanese government began acquiring land for a proposed “bullet train” that 
was to run from Tokyo to Osaka, and on to Shimonoseki at the western tip of the Honshu 
Island, at speeds of up to 124 mph (200 km per hour). However the project was shelved 
due to the World War II. It was revived again after the war when the main Tokyo-Osaka 
corridor was experiencing increasingly heavy congestion, with 186 passenger trains and 
124 freight trains traveling the corridor each day. The highways were also heavily congested 
and the fastest way to travel between Tokyo from Osaka was a one-hour flight by air.
The densely populated corridor is a highly active economic region that accounts for 50 
percent of Japanese GDP; hence, efficient movement of goods and passengers along 
the corridor is a national priority. The key motivation of the project was the need to ease 
congestion and improve capacity on both the rail and highway corridors.
Japan National Railways then-president Shinji Sogo and vice president of engineering 
Hideo Shima are credited with being influential in convincing the government to pursue the 
Shinkansen option. Three development options were under consideration at the beginning 
of the project: a parallel, narrow-gauge line next to existing rail lines; a narrow-gauge line 
on a new route; or a standard-gauge* line on a new route. The Shinkansen project was 
eventually built to the standard gauge specification. This meant other Japanese trains 
could not share its tracks. Additional distinguishing features in are the use of lightweight 
electric multiple unit (EMU) train sets† and separate stations for the Shinkansen. The actual 
operating speed of the Shinkansen of 130 miles per hour over the 500-km route put the 
Tokaido Shinkansen on a firm footing to compete with automobile and rail in terms of travel 
time along the length of the corridor. 
* Gauge is the distance between rails: the narrow gauge then was 1,067 mm (based on British standard 
   gauge), while the worldwide standard gauge was 1,435 mm. 
† EMU stands for Electric Multiple Units, which are trains where each carriage had its own electric motor 
   unit, in contrast to trains where the carriages were drawn by a locomotive unit at the end.
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The $3.2 billion project was financed partially by a $80 million World Bank loan.18 Kasai19 
and Wakuda20 both report that Shinji Sogo made a strategic decision to obtain a World 
Bank loan in order to ensure the Japanese government did not back out of the project 
midstream. Sogo eventually had to resign over controversies that he was funneling funds 
from other railway projects to the Shinkansen project when the project’s initial $1.6 billion 
estimate ballooned to $3.2 billion. Kasai and Wakuda both state the initial low estimate 
was intentional, as Sogo knew the government would not have approved the project at 
full cost. The project was finally completed in October 1964 and opened just in time for 
the Tokyo Olympics. Published documentation of this kind has been used by opponents 
of high-speed rail in the US. Given that most of the loan packages for Japan’s later HSR 
lines had to be restructured and some of the debt written off, the issue of the reliability 
of projections for HSR demand and construction costs is not trivial. Since several of the 
proposed US HSR lines could be built within the same decade, the government could find 
that by the time it has enough data to credibly estimate costs and evaluate projections; 
most of the HSR funding will have been disbursed and spent.
Achievements
The Tokaido Shinkansen initially reduced the six-hour-and-forty-minute conventional rail 
trip time to four hours. Future vehicle upgrades to the Tokaido Shinkansen reduced the 
travel time to less than three hours. The latest published schedules,21 indicate the new 
N700 train sets makes the Tokyo-Osaka trip in 2 hours 33 minutes at a speed of 270 km 
per hour. The train has a very high level of reliability with reported average delay of 0.6 
minutes per train (over the entire year), even counting uncontrolled circumstances, such 
as natural disasters.22 The project has been hailed as a success because of its high level 
of ridership and revenue generation.
Competition with Air Travel
The various Shinkansen lines are very competitive with air travel at distances of 200 
miles or more (three hours by auto) as illustrated by three typical trips below:
• Tokyo-Osaka (320 miles): both the Shinkansen system and the airlines make this 
journey in two-and-a-half hours (including boarding time), but the Shinkansen system 
offers 238 departure times per day (approximately once every 10 minutes*) while 
airlines offer only 110. The Shinkansen has more than 80 percent market share.
• Tokyo-Okayama and Tokyo-Hiroshima lines: Air and rail travel times are again the 
same, as is the greater frequency of Shinkansen departures. However, due to flexible 
air ticket fares and occasional promotions, the market share is approximately equal 
for both.
• Tokyo-Fukuoka (665 miles): The Shinkansen takes about five hours with the fastest 
model, while the flight takes only two hours. The frequency of the Shinkansen is 
less than the airlines as well. Most of these passengers prefer to fly because of the 
substantial difference in travel time.
* Nozomi use the N700 Series trains that are capable of speeds of 300 miles per hour and is the fastest 
   service on the Sanyo and Tokaido Shinkasen lines.
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Travelers prefer the Shinkansen because of the high departure frequency, high on-time 
schedule reliability, low fares, convenience and safety. There are also a high number of 
local transit lines connecting to the system, making it easy to conveniently access the 
system. For trips greater than four hours, airlines become more attractive because the 
time saved provides greater value than the cost savings of rail.
System Expansion
Spurred on the by the high level of patronage of the Tokaido Shinkansen, the Japanese 
government passed the Nationwide Shinkansen Railway Development Act23 to develop 
a nationwide Shinkansen railway system connecting the major urban areas. The act 
served as the basis for extending the Shinkansen lines to cover the whole nation. The 
law establishing the act states “the goal is to boost the national economy, expand the 
livelihood domain of the citizenry, and promote regional development.” Shinkansen 
railways are defined as railway lines that could attain speed of 200 km per hour, or more, 
in predominant sections along the line.
The first expansion was the Sanyo Shinkansen, which extended the Osaka end 
southwestward 389 miles to Hakata. Next, the Tokyo end was expanded 335 miles 
northward to Morioka as the Tohuku Shinkansen. The next extension was the 200-mile 
Joetsu line from Tokyo to Niigata. Plans for other Shinkansen lines include the Kyushu 
(westward from Hakata to Kagoshima-Chou), the Akita (Morioka to Shin-Aomori), the 
Nagano (Tokyo-Omiya-Nagano), and the Yamagata, and Hokkaido Shinkansen.
The development act gave the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure, Transportation, and Tourism 
responsibility for development of the HSR lines. Once the Basic Plan was outlined by the 
Infrastructure Ministry, the Japan Railway Construction, Transport and Technology Agency 
(JRTT), in conjunction with the ministry, selected the contractor and operator. The act also 
allowed for JRTT to be appointed as a contractor. Construction costs were to be shared 
between the National government and the municipalities through which the lines passed, 
and municipalities were responsible for land acquisition related to the project.
Current State
The Shinkansen system now comprises a network of high-speed railway lines operated 
by six companies under the Japan Railways Group. In addition to reducing travel time, the 
system has improved energy efficiency. HSR is four times as efficient as automobile travel 
and five times as efficient as airline travel. According to Okada,24 the per capita emission 
of CO2 by the Shinkansen is one-fifth that of automobiles and one-sixth that of airlines.
Cost
The gains in speed and convenience came at a high price. Construction costs were very 
high due to the high cost of land acquisition and the rugged topography of Japan25, which 
required extensive tunneling, and bridge building. More than 140 miles of the project 
involved expensive infrastructural features that accounted for 45 percent of the project 
costs.
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The Tokaido line has 80 tunnels (totaling more than 38 miles), and the Tanna Tunnel, the 
longest, is close to five miles in length. The line has eleven miles of bridges, a mile-and-a-
half-long subway and expensive, elevated tracks. The Sanyo and Sanyo Shinkansen also 
have a similar profile, with Taniguchi26 putting the final infrastructure and land costs at 58 
and 25.8 percent of the project, respectively.
The total cost and cost-per-mile for newer Shinkansen lines have increased with each 
line. When the Tokaido line was built, the construction cost was $2.66 million per mile, the 
Joetsu line ended up costing $32 million per mile. 
Table 4. Cost per Mile of Shinkansen Systems27
 Million (US$) Section Length  Cost/Mile 
Tokaido 920 346 2.66 
Sanyo 2950 389 7.58 
Tohoku 11,020 335 32.90 
Joestu 6690 209 32.01 
Revenue	and	Profitability
Demand for the Tokaido Shinkansen is high, as it is built along a heavily travelled and 
congested rail and air corridor. Annual ridership for the Tokaido line in 2009 was 149 million 
passengers, or approximately 409 thousand passengers daily. Though the project overran 
its budget, the high level of ridership on the dense corridor generated enough revenue 
within ten years to pay for both construction and operating costs.28 Though the Tokaido 
Shinkansen was profitable, the mismanagement of the Japanese National Railways (JNR), 
which was in charge of the country’s railway system, cast a shadow over its success.
JNR began to experience deficits in 1966, shortly after the Tokaido Shinkansen was 
completed. The operating losses continued to rise due to a combination of factors: the 
government rejected multiple requests by JNR to increase rail fares overall; politicians 
pushed for the construction of local railway lines in their districts despite the fact that existing 
lines were losing money; and the government approved legislation to provide subsidies to 
JNR but never issued the funding and instead pushed the agency to borrow money from 
the private sector via bonds. These and several other factors, including overstaffing, a 
heavily subsidized fare system,29 and a push to build new Shinkansen lines, eventually led 
to JNR accumulating an unsustainable level of debt.
Multiple reorganization and restructuring plans were initiated starting in 1996 
but the Japanese government sidestepped the issue of raising fares until 1976. 
By then it was “too little too late.” Even though fares doubled on some commuter routes 
between 1978 and 1982 JNR’s losses continued to accelerate until, in 1988. Taxpayers 
had to shoulder $233 billion of the company’s debt as part of a restructuring plan. The 
original JNR was broken up and privatized. The Shinkansen systems were split into several 
Japanese railway companies, each responsible for a given section of the Shinkansen 
system.
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The Tokaido line has continued to be profitable and even has supported $41 billion of the 
debt of the Sanyo, Tohoku and Joetsu Shinkansen lines. The island Japanese Railway (JR) 
lines (JR Hokkaido, JR Shikoku, JR Kyushu) continue to be subsidized by the government, 
so the low-density unprofitable lines with low travel volumes can continue operations. 
Kasai’s book the Japanese National Railways – Its Breakup and Privatization chronicles 
the factors that led to the demise of the JNR in relation to the development of Japan’s 
Shinkansen System. Matsuda30 also published an excellent discussion on the system in 
“Making the Impossible Possible: One Man’s Mission to Reform the Japanese Railways.”
TAIWAN AND KOREA: PRIVATIZATION VERSUS PUBLIC FUNDING
We compare the Taiwan and Korea high-speed rail projects because they were built at 
nearly the same time and the respective governments took different funding approaches. 
Taiwan pursued a “build-operate-transfer” model, which was a first for HSR projects, 
while Korea used the standard public funding approach. Korea wanted to gain expertise 
in the technology, while Taiwan wanted the system built with minimum involvement from 
the government. The comparison will be of interest to states in the US as they consider 
different funding mechanisms. 
The Taiwan HSR (THSR) was built to ease increasing congestion on the highway network 
due to intercity travel between Taipei and Kaohsiung. Construction on the HSR line began 
in March 2000, and the project was completed and put into service in January 2007. 
The THSR is based on Japan’s Model 700 Shinkansen system and has a top speed of 186 
mph along the 214-mile line. Its mechanical and electrical systems are built to European 
standards. It was co-developed by Central Japan Railway Company and West Japan 
Railway Company as a modification of the Shinkansen 700-E series trains. The completed 
HSR train reduced the travel time between Taipei and Kaohsiung from 4.5 hours to just 90 
minutes.
The THSR system currently has eight stations – Taipei, Banciao, Taoyuan, Hsinchu, 
Taichung, Chiayi, Tainan, and Zuoying – with five more planned for the future (in Nangang, 
Miaoli, Changhua, Yunlin and Kaohsiung). THSR reached the 5-million-passenger 
milestone five months after it was launched and by September 2007 had sold more than 
ten million tickets.31 The system carried more than 15 million passengers in its first year of 
operation, an average of 65,000 per day. Train schedules have been ramped up from 19 
per direction per day to 60. The system currently provides 91 services per day, about the 
half capacity of the line.
Thirteen billion dollars was to be invested in the Taiwan HSR project using a build-operate-
transfer (BOT) strategy. The reported total construction cost, however, was $18 billion.
The high-speed rail system generated revenues of $18.3 and $20.39 million in its first two 
months of operation, far below the monthly expenditure of over $304 million.32 After nine 
months of operation the reported sales was a total of US $279.6 million. Table 5 gives a 
breakdown of monthly revenue from January 2007 through May 2009. It shows revenue 
almost doubled from 2007 to 2008 and was gradually increasing in 2009.
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Table 5. Monthly Revenue from Taiwan’s High-Speed Rail System
 
2007 2008 2009
NT$ (millions) NT$ (millions) NT$ (millions)
January 599.3 1,551.0 2,230.9 
February 669.3 1,728.6 1,735.1 
March 867.7 1,903.9 1,908.8 
April 1,030.3 2,100.0 1,856.1 
May 1,078.2 1,903.5 2,040.4 
June 1,136.0 1,875.9 
July 1,282.2 2,038.4 
August 1,260.0 2,168.6 
September 1,268.3 1,816.1 
October 1,320.4 2,109.9 
November 1,414.0 2,028.7 
December 1,578.3 1,991.6 
Total 13,503.8 23,216.0  
Korea also recently completed construction of new high-speed rail lines. The 256-mile 
Korean HSR connects the capital, Seoul, to Busan in the south. The project was developed 
in two Phases: Phase 1 from Seoul to Daegu, began in 1992 and was completed in 2004, 
while Phase II from Daegu to Busan was completed in November 2010. Upgrades were 
also made to the conventional rail line from Daejeon to Mokp’o in the southwestern portion 
of the country.
Private versus Public Investment
The two countries, Korea and Taiwan, chose very different approaches to building their 
projects because they had different objectives. Korea went with a publicly funded project 
administered through the Korean High-Speed Rail Construction Authority, while Taiwan 
took the private track, using a build-operate-transfer funding mechanism to fund the project.
Both countries were building to relieve congestion on their road networks, but Korea had 
an additional objective of acquiring the technical knowledge and capability to build high-
speed rail lines. For Taiwan, the absence of the latter objective made it easier to privatize 
their project in the form of a 35-year build-operate-transfer contract. Privatization was to 
bring several benefits, including:
• Minimizing the extent of political interference in the project (the public agency, which 
can be easily influenced by politicians, operated more in an administrative role, with 
limited decision-making power politicians had limited influence once terms of the 
contract were finalized and executed)
• Having the contractor source project funds from the private sector freed up public 
sector funds that would otherwise have been tied up on the project
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• Using private sector funds additionally reduced the level of risk facing public sector 
funding (HSR for Taiwan is high risk in the sense that they had no prior technological 
knowledge and would be learning on the project)
• Sourcing of private sector capital puts pressure on the BOT contractor to make 
judicious use of the funds in order to both minimize interest payments, and maximize 
any returns over the life of the project
• The contractor had a high incentive to complete the project in a timely manner, as 
the 35-year contract concession period included the construction phase
In choosing this approach, Taiwan sacrificed the ability to acquire HSR technology 
capability. This is understandable; given the size and shape of the country, it is unlikely 
many HSR lines will be built in the future. Korea, on the other hand, has the potential to 
expand and upgrade several of their existing rail lines around the country.
In retrospect, the Taiwanese did not achieve most of their goals. Kien-hong and Johannesson 
document how the ridership projections for the project never materialized. Within two years 
(in 2009) the government had to take over the project.33 The government also allowed the 
system to be built to European standards and then forced the use of Japanese rolling 
stock. The resulting incompatibility caused major cost increases and schedule delays. 
Initial ridership projections of 140,000 passengers per day never materialized. In the first 
year the ridership numbers were abysmal at 50,000 passengers – a little more than one-
third of the original projection. By 2010, almost four years after service started, ridership 
was at 101,000 passengers per day.34 
CHINA: USING HIGH-SPEED RAIL TO DRIVE DEVELOPMENT
China has achieved remarkable progress in building up its high-speed rail system. The 
China high speed rail program was launched in 2003, and the first line – the D460, from 
Shanghai to Suzhou – went into service in 2007.
Motivation and Development of HSR System
The key initial motivation behind China’s HSR program was boosting economic 
development by connecting key major cities, and freeing up capacity on overcrowded 
freight corridors. In line with this objective, technology transfer has been a core component 
of the nation’s high-speed rail development program. China insisted from the onset that 
all foreign companies that won contracts to build HSR lines form joint ventures with local 
companies and commit to technology transfer. The proposed massive market of more than 
8,000 miles of HSR lines in one country gave China a very strong negotiating position, as 
there was no single concentrated purchase of HSR technology.
China’s HSR program rollout has been accelerated recently, and by the end of 2008, the 
nation had more than 3,986 miles of HSR lines with speeds above 124 miles per hour. The 
current plan is to expand the system to 8,077 miles lines by 2012, with 4,900 of those miles 
traveled by trains that operate at speeds above 217 mph.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
22 International High-Speed Rail Development
China has 2,191 km of high-speed rail tracks, with design speeds of 350 km per hour. In 
2010, China’s HSR led the world in network size. The country also has the world’s longest 
line: 1,069 km, running from Wuhan to Guangzhou.35 The Beijing-Tianjin line is China’s 
most heavily used line. It began commercial service on August 1, 2008, seven days before 
the Olympics. It shortened the 75-mile trip from 2 hours to half an hour and was the first 
train model completely developed in China. The model, called “Dongchezu,” set a new 
speed record of 217 miles per hour for a commercially running train.
Acquiring Technology
Most of the major international high-speed rail train makers, including Alstom (France), 
Bombardier (Germany), and Kawasaki (Japan), transferred technology to China that the 
Chinese integrated to eventually build their local CRH (China High-speed Rail) train sets. 
Several models have been developed from the technology gained. Most of the parts for 
CHR trains are manufactured locally. The fastest CRH train set as of the time of this writing 
was the CRH380 series, which can achieve design speeds of up to 380 km per hour.
China has been so successful in adapting the technology; it has begun competing for 
projects on the international scene. The China Railway Construction Corporation (CRCC) 
has won contracts to build HSR lines in several countries. Both Siemens and Alstom have 
teamed up with CRCC to build HSR in Saudi Arabia, and China recently put in a bid to 
construct and finance California’s high-speed rail project.
China’s Maglev train between Shanghai International Airport and Pudong was the first 
commercial service line in the world. The train completes the 18-mile journey in less than 
8 minutes at speeds of 268 miles per hour. Ridership, however, has been very low – about 
20 percent of capacity – as the train only terminates at an airport and most travelers are 
not willing to pay the $7 one-way fare. A map of the China High-Speed Railway network is 
shown in Figure 4.
Profitability
The construction cost of HSR lines in China have varied widely from approximately 8 to 
55 million US dollars per mile in 2011. This wide variation is very typical of HSR lines, 
as construction costs are affected by the number of tunnels and bridges, terrain, land 
acquisition costs, and passage through densely populated areas and downtown districts. 
The variation is not unexpected given the size of the network. Compared to Japan, China’s 
land acquisition costs are at the low end, and the government does not need to buy land 
as most of the land in China is publicly owned and managed by provincial governments.
The China high-speed rail program has faced some challenges recovering cost. Though 
limited publicly published reports could not be accessed for this study, it appears the HSR 
is mainly attracting premium air and business travelers rather than travelers from auto 
and rail modes. Two lines from Beijing to Jinan in Shandong province and from Tianjin to 
Jinan had to be suspended in July 2011,36 as ridership levels were at 20 percent capacity. 
It appears several of the Chinese HSR lines have not been profitable.
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Figure 4. Main Lines in China’s High-Speed Rail Network
Source: TransportPolitic (modified by author).
Setbacks
Despite early successes China’s high-speed rail has suffered some setbacks. In July 2011, 
39 people died when a high-speed train ran into the back of another, which had stalled, on 
a viaduct near Wenzhou after lightning cut its power supply. Six carriages derailed and four 
fell from the viaduct 20 to 30 meters (65 to 100 ft.), killing 32 people and injuring nearly 200 
people.37 In addition, the Railway’s minister was forced to resign in February 2011 over 
corruption allegations related to the development of China’s high-speed rail system. 
The Chinese have slowed their trains, partly because of the accident, but also to save 
energy: the extra demand is not worth the extra energy. The government will need to act 
quickly and responsibly to improve safety and public confidence in the system if it wants to 
sustain and increase demand on HSR lines in the country.
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EUROPE: BUILDING UP AN INTERCONNECTED HIGH-SPEED RAIL 
NETWORK
This section gives an overview of the HSR projects in major countries in Europe. The 
countries with the most developed HSR networks in Europe are France, Germany, Italy 
and Spain.
France
France kicked off the HSR race in Europe when it launched the Paris-to-Lyon TGV 
(Train à Grand Vitesse) HSR train line in 1983. The project was motivated by the need to 
increase capacity on congested sections of their existing network. It involved developing 
a completely new alignment that shortened the existing track length from 520 to 120 km 
(323 to 74 miles). New, lighter train sets that needed less expensive infrastructure were 
developed for the system.
Achievements
As in Japan this first (for France) HSR project was very successful in many respects total 
traffic on the corridor almost doubled from 12.5 to 22.9 million passengers between 1980 
and 1992, 18.9 million of whom rode the TGV-HSR (Vickerman 1997).38 The TGV both 
generated new trips and diverted trips from other modes. It reduced travel times between 
Paris and Lyon to two hours from four hours. Air travel between Paris and Lyon fell by 50 
percent from 1980 to 1984, while car traffic on the A6, a parallel motorway, grew at about 
one-third the rate of other nearby motorways.
Expansion
The project was financed by the national railway SNCF and was fully amortized by 1993. 
Due to the resounding success of the Paris-Lyon project the government teamed up with 
SNCF to develop and extend the network in France.
The network was extended westward and southwest as the TGV-Atlantique in 1989. The 
southern portion of TGV-Atlantique connects Paris to Bordeaux through Tours, reducing 
the Paris-Bordeaux journey from four hours to three. Two years after the line opened, rail 
travel between and Paris and Bordeaux had increased by 17 percent while air travel had 
dropped by 50 percent. The westward link connected Paris to Nantes. The government 
funded 30 percent of the construction cost for TGV-Atlantique.
Next to be built was TGV-Nord in 1993, which connected Paris to Lille in the north. The link 
was developed in anticipation of the Paris-Lille-London line through the Channel Tunnel. 
Traffic grew by 25 percent in the first three years. Other extensions to the TGV network 
include the TGV Rhône-Alpes (1992/1994), which extended the Lyon line southward, 
creating connections to Spain at Beziers and into Italy at Nice.
It is worth noting that, as in Japan, the expanded lines have not been as profitable as the 
initial line. Vickerman induced demand by examining the impacts of the three-pronged 
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French network on business traffic. He found the effects varied significantly and are very 
context-specific. For example, in the case TGV- Paris-Lyon, the traffic growth was in both 
directions. Along the TGV-Atlantique there were mixed results. Tours, which is an hour 
from Paris by TGV, witnessed a 24 percent reduction in business traffic while Nantes, 
two hours from Paris, saw business traffic grow 66 percent. However the growth was 
unbalanced, with a 99 percent increase in traffic originating from Paris but only 55 percent 
increase in the traffic originating from Nantes. From Paris to Toulouse (5 hours), even 
though business traffic grew 21 percent, the increase was mainly due to the market share 
grabbed from airlines. Thirty-five percent of the growth was from Toulouse, while traffic 
originating from Paris actually fell by 5 percent.
The key takeaway is that, aside from the much-trumpeted potential of HSR to grab market 
share from airlines, depending on how much economic activity occurs between specific 
origin-destination pair, some regions tend to benefit more than others. According to 
Vickerman39,40 regional studies in Europe seem to indicate HSR leads to a concentration of 
economic activity at the already-developed economic centers. In a review, Chapulut, Jean-
Noel and Jean-Pierre Taroux note that several TGV projects have overestimated demand 
and underestimated costs and few have achieved their target rates of return.41
Figure 5. France National High-Speed Rail Network
Germany
Germany tested an EMU train with speed of 124 miles per hour in 1903 but did not put 
their Inter-City-Express (ICE) trains in service until 1990. High-speed rail was introduced in 
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Germany to increase capacity for both passenger and freight trains and free up bottlenecks 
on north-south routes. In developing their HSR system, Germany opted to build the tracks 
to serve both freight and passenger trains. According to Giovani, “This feature turned out 
to be a disadvantage since it led to high construction costs (to support the higher load of 
freight trains) and low utilization of the lines (since freight trains operate at much lower 
speeds).”42
Due to the presence of several medium-sized cities spread out around the country, 
HSR development in Germany is more diffuse compared to France, with an emphasis 
on upgrading speeds on existing lines rather than building new dedicated HSR lines. 
In general, the German network has lower speeds compared to the system in France. 
Passenger load factors* in the German system are averaging 50 percent compared to 70 
percent in the French network.43
Spain
The Spanish AVE (Alta Velocidad Espanola, or “Spanish high-speed”), network is similar 
to that in France in that it is centered on Madrid. According to Boras, et al (2011), the 1979 
General Railway Master Plan for Spain had proposed the construction of three new lines to 
resolve capacity constraints in the existing network.44 One of the constrained corridors was 
the Getafe-Córdoba section between Madrid and Seville. It was built to the international 
gauge of (1,435 mm) instead of the Iberian one (1,668 mm). The line was then extended 
to Seville as the country’s first HSR line. The key HSR route in Spain, from the south, is 
Seville-Madrid-Barcelona which then connects to the network in France (see Figure 5). 
Service is available westward from Madrid to Valencia and then north to Barcelona. There 
are plans to develop the network to cover the western portion of the country and also 
connect to Portugal.
A unique feature of Spain’s network is the fact that the existing rail is built to the Iberian 
gauge (i.e., the distance between the two parallel rails) of 1,672 m (5 ft. 55/6 in.), which is 
different from the international standard gauge of 1,435 mm (4 ft. 81/2 in.). The HSR trains 
in Spain are thus designed to run on both gauges. Newly constructed HSR lines in Spain 
use the international gauge; however a section of the Madrid-to-Barcelona track (from 
Zaragoza to Huesca) is constructed to be used by both standard-gauge high-speed trains 
and Iberian-gauge Spanish trains. The additional engineering to implement such links 
increases the cost of the HSR system.45
Developing a System-Wide Network in Europe
As shown in Figure 6, the HSR network in Europe has its core in the cities of Brussels and 
Lille. The three-pronged network in France has been a central link in the bid to build up a 
European high-speed rail network. Lille is connected to London to the west and Paris in 
the south, while Brussels is connected to Amsterdam in the north and Cologne to the east.
* Load Factor – percent of available seat capacity utilized. If on a given trip a train with 200 has seats 120 
   seats filled then load factor is 102/200=0.6.
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Though France, Italy, Spain and Germany have the most extensive high-speed rail 
networks, they are not the only countries pursing HSR development in Europe. Several 
countries, namely Sweden, Norway, Poland, Finland, Turkey, and the United Kingdom, are 
all at various stages of either building HSR lines or upgrading their existing lines to speeds 
between 100-155 miles per hour.
These upgraded lines are sometimes referred to as accelerated–rail to distinguish them 
from high-speed rail. Despite the name, these projects still require substantial investments 
and significantly improve the door-to-door travel times of travelers, ultimately attracting 
travelers from other modes to rail, which is the core motivation for developing HSR.
In 1996 the European Union (EU) decided to get involved in HSR development and issued 
its first directive46 on HSR. The directive noted that there are major differences between 
the regulations of each nation and the internal rules of the national railways in the Union. 
The internal rules incorporate techniques that are specific to the national industries. These 
internal rules tend to prescribe specific dimensions and devices and special characteristics 
that create situations that made it difficult for high-speed trains to run normally throughout 
community territory.47
The EU also noted that this setup creates “very close links between the national railway 
industries and the national railways, to the detriment of the genuine opening-up of 
contracts.”
• The directive defined essential technical specifications for interoperability (TSIs) to 
ensure interoperability in the fields of infrastructure, energy, control-and-command 
and signaling, and rolling-stock for the trans-European high-speed train system.
• The directive also defined HSR as “specially built high-speed lines equipped for 
speeds generally equal to or greater than 250 km/h, or specially upgraded high-
speed lines equipped for speeds of the order of 200 km/h, or - specially upgraded 
high-speed lines which have special features as a result of topographical, relief or 
town-planning constraints, on which the speed must be adapted to each case.” 
• The directive created a body with a director and staffs to check and ensure national 
rail organizations and operators were abiding by the directive. The directive was 
further updated in 2002.48 Among other things, the update extended the rules to 
apply to renewals or maintenance-related replacement. In addition the directive 
states that, upon request, “Member State informs the other Member States and 
the Commission of the relevant national technical rules in use for achieving 
interoperability and meeting the essential requirements of Directive 96/48/EC.” 
The EU’s initial efforts to develop a Trans-European Rail Network (TEN) have been focused 
on formulation of policies to ensure interoperability of equipment. However, the current 
system is very inefficient for travelers making trips across multiple countries because 
ticketing is handled by multiple entities that have overlapping jurisdiction. For example, 
Thalys operates lines between Paris-Brussels-Cologne-Amsterdam, this overlaps with 
SNCF (France) and Eurostar (joint UK, French and Belgian) services between Lille and 
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
28 International High-Speed Rail Development
Brussels, and ICE (German) services between Brussels and Cologne.49 This is because 
the European HSR networks were developed and operated by individual countries before 
the EU began developing TEN. The development of the TEN remains a work in progress 
and much needs to be done to make the system truly trans-European, especially from the 
perspective of travelers.
Figure 6. High-Speed Rail Network in Europe in 2010 
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IV. TOWARD A MORE COHERENT US HIGH-SPEED RAIL 
POLICY FRAMEWORK
The review of international HSR experiences shows that countries that have implemented 
HSR have very focused reasons for pursuing HSR systems. Korea and Taiwan used HSR 
to relieve congestion on both their conventional rail and road networks. Europe has used 
HSR to relieve congestion on their conventional rail lines by providing additional capacity 
with improved quality of service and, in some cases, to spur economic development. 
France built separate, new HSR lines that took the passenger trains off the freight lines to 
improve passenger travel times and also free up capacity for freight trains. Germany also 
built their HSR systems to improve passenger travel times. Freeing up capacity for freight 
was not as crucial in the case of Germany as the HSR trains are built to share tracks with 
the conventional and freight trains. China is using HSR to spur economic development, 
and free up capacity in their rail network for freight trains. These justifications, however, do 
not work as well for HSR in the US.
MAKING THE CASE FOR HIGH-SPEED RAIL IN THE US
The issues that will drive development of HSR in the US are different from those in Europe 
and Asia. Intercity travelers benefit from the well developed interstate highway system and 
mainly experience congestion close to their origin and destination cities. Areas like the 
Northeast Corridor, where several urban areas lie close together along an extensive stretch, 
are the exception. Due to the large area encompassed by the US, and long distances 
between major population centers (compared to Europe), most roadway congestion in 
the US is experienced by commuters making short trips (less than 100 miles) during the 
morning and evening peak periods50 rather than long distance trips in the 100- to 500-
mile range where HSR has the highest payoff. Hence, the case for implementing HSR to 
reduce current congestion levels on the road network is weak.
In fact, extensive investment in the interstate highway and airport system in the US has 
made it harder to build a competitive case for additional investment in HSR. 
The ownership structure of the rail network in the US is the opposite of most of the 
countries reviewed. In the US, freight companies own most of the rail network and Amtrak, 
the passenger train operator, has to negotiate with them for use of their lines. Hence, 
there is no pressing need to free up capacity for freight companies. Amtrak owns the 
Northeast Corridor tracks from Washington, DC to New York and from New Haven to the 
Massachusetts.
Unlike airports and roads that are built in all states, HSR systems perform best along 
corridors passing through clusters of high-density-population centers with significant 
economic activity. An examination of Figure 2 shows that several US states do not have 
designated HSR corridors because they do not have these high-density, economically 
active population centers. This has implications when HSR policy and funding is debated 
at the federal level. Representatives from states that will not have HSR lines may adopt 
stances ranging from lukewarm to opposing HSR projects. Some level of negotiation will 
be needed to iron out the HSR funding level and source.
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We believe one of the reasons why the US continues to lack a firm HSR policy framework 
is that advocates have not developed a few key, compelling arguments that politicians can 
coalesce behind to push for HSR development. HSR advocates in the US tend to tout the 
environmental benefits, job creation potential, safety and high travel time reliability of HSR.
The job creation benefit, though appealing in the current recessionary environment, may 
not sound very attractive to policymakers (legislators) once the recession turns around 
and the economy is on the mend. ARRA is a typical example. It was easy to set aside $8 
billion for HSR in the bill based on its job creation potential; however, James Oberstar’s 
follow-up proposal for $50 billion did not materialize. Job creation is a benefit that will be 
realized as HSR projects are built, but it is not a good justification for investing in HSR 
because, inter alia, the same jobs would be created from any transportation infrastructure 
of other investment programs.
The environmental impact benefits, though acceptable, are much harder for the average 
everyday traveler to perceive. Most travelers make their daily choice of transportation 
modes based on economic/cost constraints rather than environmental considerations; 
hence, there is limited pressure on legislators from constituents to invest in HSR for 
its environmental benefits. It is also worth mentioning that other researchers question 
the environmental benefits of HSR, arguing that the benefits change based on whether 
emissions from the construction are included, and also on the no-build case used in each 
context.51 
The on-time reliability, improved speeds (shorter travel times), and safety of HSR may be 
the strongest selling point for HSR in the US. The challenge is that these benefits are best 
seen when one rides or experiences an HSR system. Most travelers in the US currently 
have no conventional rail service available, and there is no HSR train for them to ride 
either. This makes it hard to rally enthusiasm among the current populace to push for HSR 
investment.
Though congestion levels on intercity highways are not at unbearable levels, most legislators 
are aware they need to develop additional capacity to support the growth in demand that 
will come with population growth in the future. HSR will definitely be a strong contender 
in meeting some of the future capacity needs. The challenge in solving future congestion 
problems is lower on the totem pole for many local public agencies that have their hands 
full grappling with rush-hour gridlock within and on the periphery of their jurisdictions. 
Dealing with HSR intercity, travel-related issues that span multiple regions and, in some 
cases, states is not high on the list of most transportation agencies and legislators and, 
is no simple matter in the context of the US Constitution which requires Congressional 
approval for interstate compacts.*
Until HSR advocates can agree on a coherent and focused rationale, or congestion 
becomes a problem on intercity routes, it appears that most HSR initiatives in the US will 
face an uphill battle.
* Interstate compacts are agreements between two or more states of the United States of America. They 
   are regulated by Article I, Section 10 of the United States Constitution which states that no state shall 
   “enter into any agreement or compact with another state, or with a foreign power” without the consent of 
   Congress.
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LEADERSHIP CHALLENGE
In the most recent MTI report on HSR, “leadership coupled with means and authority” 
was identified as a critical ingredient for success of HSR projects.52 For example, though 
political leaders in Pennsylvania were enthusiastic about HSR early on, they made almost 
no headway until 1999 when Amtrak and the State entered into a joint Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU). The MOU provided $140 million for infrastructure and equipment 
upgrades on the Philadelphia Harrisburg line to reduce trip times to 90 minutes (shortest 
current rail trips is 1 hour 40 minutes and drive time is 1 hour 56 minutes). This is an 
arrangement whereby leadership, authority to execute the project, and the financial means 
came together.
HSR projects also face opposition from specific communities that may be impacted or 
even perceive a negative impact from an HSR project. This is played out very clearly in the 
case of California where there is stiff opposition from communities along the HSR project 
line, such as Palo Alto and Orange County. The most formidable obstacle at the state level 
has been political support.
Florida’s HSR has never lacked for champions (leaders) for its HSR initiatives. These have 
included Governor Bob Graham (1979-1987) and recent avid advocates, such as Doc 
Dockery, who spent his personal funds to draft and promote a constitutional amendment 
directing the legislature to develop a high-speed rail system. Due to difficulty getting buy-
in from Florida governors and legislators, the state has lacked the means and authority. 
Recently, even after federal funds were allocated to fully pay for the Tampa-Orlando 
project, it was shut down when the governor returned the funds to the federal government.
Clearly, all three ingredients – leadership, means and authority – are key to the success of 
HSR initiatives, but leadership with authority appears to be the most critical ingredient for 
HSR initiatives to survive. Even with careful planning, a well-laid-out legislative framework 
and adequate funding from the federal government, the governor was able to scuttle the 
Tampa-to-Orlando project simply by rejecting the federal funds.
Florida Example: Chen53 believes a series of political and strategic factors came to-
gether for Florida being given such a large sum. He notes that the I-4 corridor popula-
tion played a key role in Obama’s 2008 victory, and also Florida’s electoral represen-
tatives actively lobbied the transportation secretary. However, he also acknowledges 
Florida’s State legislature worked hard to put together a cost sharing package that 
made it clear to the federal government they wanted the project. Additional strategic 
factors that played a role in the decision were:
•	 The federal government needs a showcase project that it can use to trumpet its 
policy decision to invest in HSR, in that sense the Tampa to Orlando corridor is one 
of the shortest that could be completed quickly
•	 Florida’s	flat	topography	will	aid	a	fast	construction	of	the	project	as	it	does	not	have	
to deal with tunneling and steep slopes (all factors that Campos and de Rus54 and 
several others have pointed out increase construction costs)
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•	 Building	the	project	along	the	along	the	Interstate	4	median	significantly	reduced	the	
cost of land acquisition as the Federal government already owns that right of way
•	 Building on the median also reduces amount of environmental impact as the existing 
freeway already has created the major impacts
•	 Florida’s State legislature worked hard to put together a package in which they 
voted to contribute $300 million to the project as cost sharing 
There may be some merit to Chen’s theory of political factors weighing in if one consid-
ers some of the comments of a recent GAO report. The report states that FRA followed 
all the standard procedure for allocating such a contract, but noted that there was no 
clear documentation why some of the projects were chosen above others.
SUSTAINED FUNDING FOR HIGH-SPEED RAIL
The cost of developing a high-speed rail system is so high that very few states have the 
means to fund the initial construction, even for potentially profitable lines; hence, federal 
funding is needed. At the federal level, most funding bills have floundered and failed.
A key factor has been that the federal government is overextended simply maintaining 
the current transportation system and other sectors of the economy, as are most state 
governments. As mentioned earlier, HSR systems perform best in areas with closely-
spaced, high-density population centers. This means that several states, particularly those 
in the Midwest, will not have HSR lines. Hence, any federal funding scheme should be 
structured so that it is acceptable to states that will not benefit directly.
The funding should be a mixture of grants, loans and bonds, but should be heavily skewed 
towards bonds. The bonds should be state-sponsored but guaranteed by the federal 
government. (The appropriate mix of grants, loans and bonds in the funding scheme is 
beyond the scope of this project.) This will ensure that those states that benefit directly 
bear most of the financial burden, reducing the likelihood of resistance from states without 
HSR projects. The federal government must establish criteria as to which HSR lines they 
will support and finance. As revealed from the review of international HSR in Europe and 
Asia, only the first couple of HSR lines developed by most nations were profitable. The 
subsequent lines that were built to expand the systems were not financially sustainable in 
most cases. The federal government should pay close attention this finding and require 
projects that receive federal support to show that ticketing revenue will cover operating 
costs plus a percentage of capital costs.
For projects spanning multiple states, member states may have to negotiate what level of 
financial responsibility they will bear, and this will require detailed negotiations and financial 
setups that are not addressed in this report. States that do not benefit directly from HSR 
will still contribute to the HSR systems through taxpayer-funded loans and grants, and 
this is equitable, since some of these citizens will, at one point or another, use the HSR 
systems. Moreover, as with urban mass transit, citizens of one state may well benefit from 
improved economic efficiency in any other state through increased business interchange.
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Also given that intercity travelers are not currently experiencing severe congestion, the 
greatest beneficiaries of the HSR systems are those who will use them ten to twenty-five 
years down the line. So having a setup where those beneficiaries pay off the bonds (cost 
of the system) in the future is more equitable than having current taxpayers fully fund the 
system.
The federal funding going forward should be initiated and set at the by Congress rather 
than the Executive branch. The funds should come from a dedicated, long-term source, 
such as an extended fuel tax. This is needed so to instill confidence in private investors 
and other stakeholders, such as train set manufacturers, that the resources they allocate to 
HSR development are a wise investment. Without a dedicated funding source and support 
from the government, these third parties will consider HSR too risky and their incentive to 
allocate capital to such projects will be minimal.
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William Vickrey proposed road congestion pricing* in the US by 1952, but no project was 
ever implemented in the states. In the 1960s the UK developed a congestion-pricing scheme 
for downtown London but did not implement it. Rather, it was Singapore that implemented 
the first project in 1975. It took 28 years, until 2003, for London to finally implement their 
downtown congestion-pricing project. Only recently has the US begun to put into place a 
hodge-podge of freeway pricing projects using congestion pricing principles.
When looking at HSR development worldwide, one is uncannily reminded of how often 
history repeats itself. In a sense, the US was a leader in the HSR race with the efforts 
to build faster interurban trains. In the early 1900s the St. Louis Car Company built a 
100 mile-per-hour train, “the private car Alabama,” for Henry Huntington’s train network in 
Southern California.55
However, once again, it was Japan an Asian country that built the first commercial HSR 
train for the 1964 Olympics before other nations began to take HSR seriously. It took 11 
years after the Shinkansen was introduced for the first commercial service train to become 
operational in Europe. Though America passed the High Speed Ground Transportation 
Act in 1965, it still does not have a fully functional HSR system. Though they are capable 
of attaining speeds of 150 miles per hour, the Acela train sets currently run at an average 
of approximately 84 miles per hour. This is due to electrification and issues related to the 
alignment of the track on the Northeast Corridor.
HSR, like most capital infrastructure projects, is expensive: current estimates of construction 
costs are in the range of $35 million to $70 million per kilometer.56 Most projects take 
several years to build, and if the projected ridership does not materialize, the project will 
suffer substantial financial losses. If projects are funded by the government, a substantial 
amount of taxpayers’ money is at risk. Given the above, it is not surprising that HSR has 
both supporters and detractors.
Supporters point to its reliability, convenience, speed, social and environmental benefits, 
revitalization of the rail industry, and job-creation potential. Detractors question the high 
sunk costs, with the accompanying high risk of public funds, and the fixed nature of rail. 
They also assert that HSR serves only a limited demographic of the population on a given 
route. As the HSR network in Europe has been developed, several studies have explored 
both sides of these debates, trying to understand the impacts of HSR and also to learn 
whether the benefits outweigh the costs.
Clearly the federal government is moving to address the financial gap. However, several 
other challenges persist. Even with private advocates like Doc Dockery in Florida and the 
full heft of the federal government, the Florida project was still shut down. The federal 
government has been forced to make a correction mid-course has delayed any hopes of 
having HSR in the Florida for some time to come.
* Road Congestion Pricing involves charging road users a fee during peak periods in order to reduce the 
   number of vehicles that will opt to use a facility during that time. This helps reduce the level of congestion 
   without building more roads to accommodate the congestion during peak periods.
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HSR has been advocated in the US based on to its ability to reduce travel time and the 
potential to create jobs and generate economic activity. The latter two justifications were 
high on the agenda when ARRA was passed. Since then, the Obama administration has 
been struggling to motivate Congress to commit to substantial funds to HSR. The downside 
of the jobs creation pitch is that, as the economic environment improves, it becomes a 
harder sell. Also, HSR has no greater potential to create jobs than any other project of 
similar size. To overcome resistance, policymakers need to come up with rational, long 
term justification for investment in HSR.
Currently, the federal government lacks a coherent policy on HSR. There is no clear-
cut legislation like the Passenger Rail Service Act (which created Amtrak) that commits 
the government to developing HSR. There is no clarity about which agency will be in 
charge of developing HSR. FRA would be the logical entity, but it has been focused on rail 
safety rather than development. As mentioned earlier, it had to scramble to put together 
staffing to disburse ARRA HSR funds. Amtrak is interested in taking a leadership role, as 
evidenced by its recent decision to create a dedicated department within the agency that 
focuses exclusively on HSR,57 but it does not have a legal mandate to administer federal 
funds for HSR projects. It is likely FRA will be the lead agency in managing HSR in the US.
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The US should consider creating a large scale, federally funded program to give it leverage 
in negotiations with foreign agencies that possess HSR technology. The nature of HSR is 
such that it is likely to be successful on selected corridors that have high population density 
and significant economic activity. The currently identified HSR corridors are adequate. 
The eleven corridors designated have very high levels of intercity travel demand and, if 
current trends continue, are likely to experience high levels of congestion in their highway 
networks due to increased population growth and high economic activity. The airports in 
most of these regions are already experiencing high levels of traffic.
Even though the designated corridors have high traffic, the current levels of congestion are 
manageable. However, since HSR involves multibillion-dollar projects that will span more 
than ten years from planning through construction, HSR projects need to begin now if they 
are to meet future needs. A large part of most HSR investment costs go into construction 
that needs to be funded long before the system begins to function and generate revenue. 
Private capital for such investments is limited due to the high uncertainty of completion, 
high risk of unprofitability and long waiting period before any revenue is generated. federal 
funding is needed because the states where these corridors are located do not have 
resources to raise such huge sums.
FEDERAL ROLE
To effectively invest such a massive amount of capital in multiple HSR projects the federal 
government needs a more structured policy framework than is currently in place. At 
minimum, the federal government needs to do the following:
1. Develop a policy framework. 
Designate the key agency that will be focused on planning, development and 
management of multiple HSR systems in the United States. The mandate of the 
agency should be clearly spelled out in a legislative instrument like the Passenger 
Rail Service Act that created Amtrak.
The Federal Railroad Administration is a good candidate but will need additional 
staff in order to maintain its current legislative rail safety mandate and function. 
The agency staff will, at minimum, need expertise in project management due to 
the size of the project, strong financial	management due to the massive amount 
of capital involved, and past experience building HSR projects due to the dif-
ferences between HSR and mainline rail.
The agency should be under (or at least affiliated with) the Department of 
Transportation so it can tap in the institutional project development and manage-
ment capacity the DOT and Federal Railroad Administration have developed over 
the years.
2. Establish dedicated funding.
A dedicated funding source should be created for the construction of HSR proj-
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ects, otherwise very few states and almost no private-sector investors will be 
willing to initiate projects.
3. Provide guiding legislation.
Federal government needs to move quickly to develop regulations and specifica-
tions for HSR design and construction, as the different performance character-
istics make them incompatible with the current specifications for rail in the US. 
When the California High-Speed Rail Authority wanted to consider tilt technology, 
for example, they had to independently work with FRA to discuss its feasibility, 
because the existing guidelines written for conventional trains do not cover this 
technology. Allowing this situation to continue will create a legal minefield and 
high insurance costs when these HSR systems need to be insured after construc-
tion.
Federal rules on legal challenges and insurance costs will help reduce the level 
of risk for HSR development and encourage private sector participation in the de-
velopment process. Without the federal government’s involvement most private 
entities will be slow to participate in public-private partnerships due to the high 
risks to capital and possible escalation of insurance costs due to lawsuits.
Almost all rail tracks in the US are owned by freight rail companies. States with 
HSR projects that want to build along those tracks or, in rare cases, use them, 
will have to negotiate with the freight rail companies directly. A law extending or 
defining the terms under which such negotiations should take place will be help-
ful to states entering into this process. The law creating Amtrak defined a frame-
work of the track-sharing relationship between Amtrak and the freight companies. 
Federal legislation is needed to define the infrastructure sharing agreements be-
tween freight companies and HSR entities.
4. Support a demonstration project.
Given the absence of HSR in the United States and the partisan nature in which 
the debate over HSR has evolved, the federal government should consider sup-
porting a corridor as a demonstration project. This demonstration project should 
be along a highly trafficked route, be relatively inexpensive and have a short 
construction timeline.
The Tampa-Orlando project in Florida that was shut down when the governor 
rejected and then returned ARRA funds would have been an ideal demonstra-
tion project. The HSR line was a good candidate as a demonstration project. The 
construction cost of $2.4 billion was covered by the allocated ARRA grant, and 
the location – in a highly visited tourist destination – promised the opportunity for 
a lot of US citizens to see and probably a ride on an HSR system. It was slated 
to be built along the median of Interstate-4 and therefore had few right-of-way 
acquisition hurdles.
In fact if one closely looks at the way the HSR funds were disbursed, the ini-
tial $2.4 billion allocated to Florida may have been an astute strategic decision. 
By allocating such a large proportion of funds to one of the most feasible proj-
ects, a showpiece HSR project would have been completed in a highly visited 
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tourist location, thereby exposing several million US citizens to the technology. 
With the Florida project cancelled and a large amount of the funding allocated to 
California’s system, which will take a long time to complete, it appears the window 
of opportunity to build such a demonstration project is almost closed.
STATE ROLE
The high costs and long lead times needed to develop HSR projects mean that states 
wanting to begin new projects need careful planning and guidance. The lessons enumerated 
from the Florida experience and the California project (see Appendix A) are anecdotal but 
very instructive.
California started with a legislative mandate that specified the role of the California High-
Speed Rail Authority, while Florida depended on a political champion and then followed up 
with the legislative mandate. Both have had rollercoaster rides trying to maintain support 
for their projects through changing administrations. Florida has had their project shut 
down and restarted at various turns, while, for California, the greater difficulty has been 
getting policymakers to fund CHSRA consistently. Both a political champion and a legally 
mandated entity are important, but given the experience of both states, it is critical the 
legislative body be established early on. 
Acquiring right-of-way in the US is a more tenuous task than in Europe and Asia, as most 
of the land and tracks in the US are privately owned. The CHSRA is having a firsthand 
experience as it has had to negotiate with various freight providers and deal with several 
environmental issues with regard to land traversed by the project. States should seriously 
consider building their HSR lines within the median of existing freeways wherever the 
alignment will permit in order to minimize environmental impacts and also because the 
right-of-way within most of these medians already belongs to the state.
Most states have limited financial resources and, unlike the federal government, cannot 
run large deficits to fund project. Hence, states that want to significantly fund their projects 
need to put in place a plan to bring in private capital as early as possible.
States that decide to embark on HSR should make sure there is formal legislation is in place. 
Given the massive amount of investment involved, most HSR projects will need some form 
of political support. States must have a well-thought-out plan, and a dedicated individual 
(or body) that will work with the various legislative and political arms of government to build 
and sustain support for their projects through the development and construction phases.
FUTURE OF THE INDUSTRY
In addition to the policy measures recommended, a huge issue facing the nascent industry 
is the lack of HSR expertise in the US. This lack of expertise is noted in a recent GAO 
report in which potential train set manufacturers say it would take a minimum of two years 
to ramp up capacity to test and build train sets in the US.
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The Mineta Transportation Institute, in collaboration with the California High-Speed Rail 
Authority, California State University, and several private and public agencies, has begun 
work on the issue. The federal government needs to quickly begin to focus on developing 
educational and training centers to build up capacity to develop the HSR workforce in the 
US.
Mineta Transportat ion Inst i tute
41
APPENDIX A: WHITE PAPER ON CALIFORNIA HIGH-SPEED 
RAIL PROJECT
California voter’s approval of a $9.95 billion State bond for California’s high-speed rail 
(HSR) project in 2008 and the Obama Administration’s decision to set aside $8 billion in the 
2009 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act (ARRA) for HSR projects have propelled 
HSR into the forefront of discussions on how to meet the nation’s future transportation 
needs.
Prior to the designation of the ARRA funds most state HSR initiatives had slowly ground to 
a halt. Other than the Northeast corridor Acela Express from Washington, DC to Boston, 
it began to look like California was the only state on track to build a high speed train 
system. This paper takes a look back at California’s experience in keeping its project alive 
despite several challenges, and the hurdles the HSR authority had to surmount to keep 
the project alive. The lessons learned are instructive for other States pursuing high-speed 
rail initiatives.
INTRODUCTION
Even though the debate about whether high-speed rail (HSR) is right for the US will 
continue, the stance of the current administration is clear. From public statements by the 
president, his vice president (an avid train enthusiast), and the secretary of transportation, 
it is apparent the executive branch has made a decision to integrate HSR into the mix of 
transportation options for the US going forward.
This paper takes a look at the development of HSR projects in the United States, with a 
focus on California’s experience to date. Prior to the designation of ARRA funds, most 
state HSR initiatives had slowly ground to a halt. Other than the Northeast Corridor Acela 
Express from Washington, DC to Boston, it began to look as if California was the only state 
on-track to build a high-speed train system. This paper takes a look back at California’s 
experience in keeping its project alive despite several challenges, the current status of the 
project, and plans of the California High-Speed Rail Authority going forward. The lessons 
learned will serve as guide for other states pursuing high-speed rail initiatives.
US HIGH-SPEED RAIL PROJECTS
Before the passage of the ARRA the Government Accountability Office (GAO) in several 
reports noted the federal government’s limited leadership role in promoting HSR projects 
in the United States in contrast to Europe and Asia. The United States continues to lag 
behind other nations in developing HSR networks. Europe has more than 5,000 miles 
of HSR lines, while Asia, with more than 6,000 miles already, plans to build more in the 
coming years.
GAO has consistently documented the need for the federal government to define a clear 
role of how high-speed rail fits into plans to meet the nation’s transportation needs. In their 
2009 report to congress, the GAO noted that although the $8 billion in ARRA funding was a 
step in the right direction, it is a relatively small down payment considering California alone 
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is expecting $18 to $21 billion in federal support to build the Los Angeles-to-San Francisco 
line. In testimony supporting the report, the GAO representative noted that “High-speed 
rail projects are costly, risky, take years to develop and build, and require substantial up-
front public investment as well as potentially long-term operating subsidies.”58
Other challenges facing states are the reliability of ridership forecasts, determining and 
quantifying public benefits, sustaining public support over long construction periods, and 
obtaining stakeholder consensus. These are all issues that have plagued California’s 
project at various stages. The GAO says there is a need for a dedicated funding source, 
leadership, clearly defined goals and a structural framework if HSR is to be implemented 
as a feasible transportation alternative in the United States.
In fairness, the federal government has made several attempts to investigate the feasibility 
of high-speed rail projects. As far back as 1965, Congress passed the High Speed Ground 
Transportation Act59 authorizing $90 million to develop and demonstrate HSR technologies. 
Five years later, in 1970, President Nixon passed the Passenger Rail Service Act,60 which 
created Amtrak to take over the intercity passenger rail service that freight rail companies 
found unprofitable.
According to the Federal Railroad Administration, it had spent up to $3.3 billion on 
improvements to the North East Corridor by 1997.61 Amtrak, in collaboration with the 
Federal Railroad Administration, has been responsible for developing the Acela Express, 
the only functioning HSR project in the United States to date, on the Northeast Corridor. The 
Acela Express train sets are capable of attaining speeds of 150 miles per hour; however, 
they operate at top speeds of only 150 miles per hour between New York and Boston and 
135 miles per hour between New York and Washington. Currently, the average operating 
speed between Washington, DC and Boston is approximately 83 miles per hour due to 
electrification- and track-related issues on the corridor.
Legislators have included high-speed rail in the Railway Safety Improvement Act (RISA),62 
and in 2010 the House Committee on Transportation and Infrastructure set aside $50 
billion for high-speed rail in the Authorization Bill, but this did not pass.
The FRA designated 11 HSR corridors in the continental US. These corridors were selected 
as a result of stipulations included in the Surface Transportation Efficiency Acts. According 
to the FRA website, the first five HSR corridors were designated under the Intermodal 
Surface Transportation Efficiency Act of 1991 (ISTEA).63 A list of the corridors designated 
under the ISTEA is provided in.
The Northeast Corridor, from Washington, DC to Boston, MA, was, until recently, technically 
not a federally designated corridor, as it is funded under a different legislative instrument, 
the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project.* In March 2011, US Transportation Secretary 
* FRA financed the Northeast Corridor Improvement Project (NECIP) between FY 1976 and FY 1998 for a 
   total cost of $3,937.3 million, including $12 million for the Penn Station Redevelopment project in FY 
   1998. Amtrak has invested in the corridor itself, though that figure is not readily available. Nevertheless, 
   certain of Amtrak’s appropriations have been directed specifically to Northeast Corridor expenses, 
   including $7.9 million in FY 1976 and $293.1 million in FY 2003 (FRA Website).
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Ray LaHood designated it an HSR corridor. The Secretary also extended the scope of the 
California corridor to Las Vegas, Nevada, in July 2009.
The FRA allocated the bulk of ARRA funds to six major corridors as shown in Table 7. 
However, several developments have changed the actual amount of funds disbursed and 
the recipients.
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Table 6. White Paper: Federally Designated High-Speed Rail Corridors
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Chicago 
Hub 
Network
Initially designated on October 15, 1992 as the Midwest corridor, it consisted of 
three spokes emanating from Chicago, IL, westward to Milwaukee, WI, east to 
Detroit, MI, and south to St. Louis, MO. In December 1998, the Milwaukee link 
was extended to Minneapolis/St. Paul, MN and a new spoke to Indianapolis, IN 
and Cincinnati, OH was added. The Indianapolis/Cincinnati link has been extended 
through Ohio in a closed loop running from Cincinnati to Columbus, Cleveland, 
and Toledo and back to Chicago. The Indianapolis link has also been extended to 
Louisville, KY.
Florida 
Corridor
Initially designated on October 16, 1992, runs from Miami in the south to Orlando 
and westward to Tampa.
California 
Corridor
Also designated October 19, 1992. Runs mainly north-south along the state, linking 
the major metropolitan areas of San Diego, Los Angeles, the San Francisco Bay Area 
and Sacramento via the San Joaquin Valley. On July 2, 2009, US Transportation 
Secretary Ray LaHood announced extension of the California high-speed rail 
corridor to Las Vegas, Nevada.
Southeast 
Corridor
Designated in October 2000 as a link between Charlotte NC, Richmond, VA, and 
Washington, DC. In December 1995, it was extended all the way to Macon, GA, 
passing through Greenville, SC, and Atlanta, GA. The Richmond link was also ex-
tended to Hampton Roads, VA. In December 1998, the Macon, GA, loop – passing 
through Jacksonville, FL, Savannah, GA, and Columbia, SC back to Raleigh, SC 
– was closed. The Southeast corridor in its final form in 1998 is better characterized 
as a network. The corridor now covers six states: Florida, Georgia, South and North 
Carolina, Virginia and Washington, DC.
Pacific 
Northwest 
Corridor
Designated in October 1992. Links Eugene, OR, to Vancouver, BC, Canada, pass-
ing through Portland, OR, and Seattle, WA, on the way north. The corridor is 466 
miles long. 
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Gulf Coast 
Corridor
Designated November 18, 1998. Another of the multi-state corridors, it traverses 
six states: Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama, Georgia and New Orleans. 
There are three legs originating from New Orleans, LA. The westward leg goes to 
Houston, TX, the eastbound leg to Mobile, AL, with an intermediate stop in Biloxi, 
MS, and a third leg runs northeast to Atlanta, with major stations in Meridian, MS, 
and Birmingham, AL.
Keystone 
Corridor
Designated in December 1998. A planned, multi-state corridor with the west/east 
link from Pittsburg, PA through Harrisburg to Philadelphia. The north/south link starts 
in Washington, DC, and runs through Baltimore, MD, Wilmington, DE, Philadelphia, 
PA, Trenton and Newark, NJ, and ends in New York. 
Empire 
State 
Corridor
Designated in December 1998. Planned to run from west to east end of New York 
State, Buffalo to New York City, with stops in Rochester, Syracuse, Utica and Albany.
Northern 
New 
England 
Corridor
Set up to connect Boston to various states in the Northwest. Boston, MA, is the 
center, with connections to Portland/Auburn, VT, and Montreal, PQ Canada, Albany, 
CT and New Haven, CT.
South 
Central 
Corridor
Designated in 2000, it is another of the multi-state corridors. The Texas link is from 
San Antonio, TX, in the south, to Dallas-Ft. Worth in the north. Dallas Ft.-Worth is 
then linked to Tulsa, OK and Little Rock, AK.
 
North-East 
Corridor
In March 2012, the Transportation Secretary officially designated the existing 
Northeast Corridor, from Washington, DC, to Boston, MA, a high-speed rail corridor.
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Three state governors – of Florida, Ohio and Wisconsin – returned their ARRA funding as 
a politically motivated protest of government spending. Due to their actions, the secretary 
of transportation reallocated the funds to other projects. To date, only $5.8 billion dollars 
of ARRA funds have been obligated. Table 8 lists both ARRA and other federal rail-related 
funds (that can be used for high-speed-rail-related projects) that have been allocated to 
states at the beginning of July 2011. The data was compiled from information on the FRA 
website.
CALIFORNIA HIGH-SPEED RAIL CASE STUDY
Comparing Table 7 and Table 8, California is now set to receive over $3 billion in federal 
funding; not counting the remaining $5 billion in ARRA funds left to be disbursed. This puts 
them in line to be one of the first fully dedicated HSR projects likely to be completed in the 
United States.
- 500 1,000 1,500 2,000 2,500 3,000 3,500 4,000
California
Washington
NorthEast Corridor
Mid-West
Massachusetts
Connecticut
Vermont
Maine
Wisconsin
Texas
Oregon
Nebraska
Missouri
West Virginia
Delaware
New Mexico
Federal Funding (US$ Millions)
Figure 7. White Paper: Breakdown of Federal HSR Funding by State HSR Projects 
in 2010
The California High-Speed Rail Authority (CAHSRA) is responsible for construction of 
California’s high-speed rail project. CHSRA came to life under the California High-Speed 
Rail Act (SB 1420)64 sponsored by Senators Kopp and Costa in 1996. Prior to that, the 
state’s high-speed rail ambitions had been nurtured by the Intercity High-Speed Rail 
Commission created in 1993. SB 1420 gave CHSRA the legislative mandate to implement 
intercity high-speed rail in the state. The Authority was to be composed of nine members, 
with five appointees by the governor, two by the Senate Committee on Rules and two by 
the Speaker of the Assembly. A lively documentation of the development of the California 
high-speed rail project is chronicled at the University of California, Davis website.65
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Table 8. White Paper: Disbursement of ARRA and High-Speed Rail Funds in 
2009/10
State Description ARRA FY09 FY10 Planning FY10 SDP Grand Total
CA California High-Speed Rail + Other State Projects 2,908,371,742  6,400,000  116,000,000 3,030,771,742 
IL
Chicago to St. Louis: 2010 
Early Construction Projects, 
Englewood Flyover
1,268,310,998  1,250,000   1,269,560,998 
WA
Pacific Northwest Corridor: 
Service Block 2-SEA-PDX 6 
RTs- ARRA Redistributed
 735,458,912     735,458,912 
NC Piedmont/Charlotte/Raleigh  520,000,000    22,000,000  542,000,000 
MD BWI Airport Station Improvements  69,400,000     69,400,000 
FL
Tampa to Orlando: 
Program Management and 
Preliminary Engineering
 66,660,000     66,660,000 
VT
Vermonter New England 
Central Railroad Route 
Improvements
 50,000,000  500,000    50,500,000 
CT New Haven to Hartford to Springfield Corridor  40,000,000     40,000,000 
ME Several projects  38,385,495   600,000   38,985,495 
NJ Portal Bridge  38,500,000     38,500,000 
WI Milwaukee to Madison Corridor  30,000,000     30,000,000 
NY Empire Corridor + Rochester Station  5,545,733  1,000,000    6,545,733 
OR Pacific Northwest Corridor: Union Station Roof  5,900,000     5,900,000 
DC Union Station Access Improvements   4,270,500    4,270,500 
MO Missouri State Rail Plan + additional projects  3,338,800   500,000   3,838,800 
MI Chicago to Detroit  3,620,552     3,620,552 
CO Colorado State Rail Plan + Denver Interregional Study   1,400,000    1,400,000 
WV West Virginia HSIPR Planning   1,000,000    1,000,000 
GA Various Studies   750,000    750,000 
PA Keystone Corridor: Keystone West   750,000    750,000 
DE Delaware Intercity Rail Connection   450,000    450,000 
KS Kansas Service Development Plan (SDP)   250,000    250,000 
NM New Mexico State Rail Plan   100,000    100,000 
Grand Total 5,783,492,232  8,120,500  1,100,000  38,000,000 5,940,712,732 
 
Note: FYO9 Fiscal Year 2009.
         FY10 Fiscal Year 2010.
         FY10 SPD Fiscal Year 2010 Service Development Program.
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SB 1420 allowed for CHSRA to be terminated at the end of December 2000 if a financial 
plan for the implementation of HSR had not been approved by state voters. As stipulated 
by the legislation, CHSRA presented its business plan in June 2000.66 The plan placed 
the cost of constructing a high-speed rail line linking San Diego to the San Francisco Bay 
Area and Sacramento at a cost of $25 billion (1999 dollars). Some of the issues the plan 
addressed are:
•	 Train systems: it deferred selection of train technology to the environmental impact 
report and environmental impact statements (EIR/EIS) but it did recommend a system 
capable of attaining speeds of 200 miles per hour, driven by electric propulsion, and 
grade separated, with state of the art signaling technology.
•	 Route/alignment: it recommended a preliminary highest return on investment but 
deferred actual selection of the final route to the EIR/EIS study. The route was from 
San Diego, through Ontario Airport, Los Angeles and then San Francisco via the 
Peninsula, with a separate leg from Merced to Sacramento.
•	 Ridership: ridership was forecast at 32 million passengers annually, of which 12.2 
million would be business travelers. The majority of the trips – 11.2 million – were 
projected to be from the Los Angeles region to the San Francisco Bay Area. The 
analysis assumed 45 percent of the ridership would be diverted from air transportation 
and 42 percent from private automobiles.
•	 Revenue: was projected at $888 million based on the expected ridership, with $465 
million of this coming from business travelers.
•	 Benefits: a benefit/cost analysis put the ratio at 2.06. This was based on benefits of 
$44.4 billion and costs of $21.5 billion.
The plan recommended that the governor and legislature take steps to initiate a formal 
Environmental Impact Report (EIR) and an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS), make 
funding available to improve access rail to the potential high-speed rail network, and step 
up advocacy at the federal level for funding for high speed trains in California. It also asked 
legislators to encourage state, regional and local entities to include high-speed trains in 
their planning.
In response to the 2000 business plan recommendations, the California legislature passed 
bills to fund both the high-speed rail project and the environmental impact studies for the 
project. The Safe, Reliable High-Speed Passenger Train Bond Act (Senate Bill 185667) 
was promulgated in 2002 to raise funds for construction of the HSR by issuing $9.95 billion 
in general bonds in California. The act required that $9 billion be used in conjunction with 
federal funds for planning and construction of the high-speed train system. The $950 million 
was to be used to improve rail access to the high-speed train system, as recommended 
by the business plan. The legislature also provided $20 million in 2004 for CHSRA and the 
FRA to conduct a programmatic level EIR/EIS study.
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Though Governor Gray Davis signed SB 1856 into law in 2002 for voters to ratify in the 
November 2, 2004, general election, the vote did not take place until 2008 in the form of 
Assembly Bill 3034. SB 1856 was first delayed by Senate Bill 1169 that postponed the vote 
to November 7, 2006, because of California’s fiscal situation. Then in June 2006, the vote 
was again moved – to the November 4, 2008, general election – and modified to Assembly 
Bill 713. Finally, in 2008, AB 3034 modified some of the provisions in the original SB 1856 
legislation, and voters passed it in the November 4, 2008 election.
Among others, AB 3034 stipulated:
• The high-speed train system was to be built to specifications of the EIR/EIS reports 
(certified November 2005 and July 2008) rather than the business plan.
• Excess revenues generated from operation of the high-speed train system (beyond 
operating and maintenance costs and financing obligations) were to be used for 
construction, expansion, improvement, replacement and rehabilitation of the system. 
If excess revenues exceeded the amount needed to maintain the system they, were 
to be deposited in the General Fund.
• The amount of the $9 billion bond that could be used for planning and environmental 
studies was limited to 10 percent ($900 million), and the amount that could be spent 
on administrative expenses to 2.5 percent.
• Priority was to be given to corridors expected to require the least amount of bond 
funds as a percentage of total cost of construction when selecting corridors for 
construction.
• The high-speed rail project was to be built as quickly as possible in order to maximize 
ridership and mobility of Californians.
• The ballot measure was renamed to Proposition 1A as it is widely referred to in the 
media.
Proposition 1A was put to the ballot on November 4, 2008, and passed with a majority 
vote of 52.6 percent (6.5 million of 12.4 million votes). A revised business plan in 2008 
increased the cost of the Los Angeles-to-San Francisco line to $33 billion (2008 dollars). 
The 2009 Report to the legislature updated the cost to $35.7 billion 2009 dollars, with a 
Year-of-Expenditure cost of $42.6 billion. In the current 2012 Updated Draft business plan, 
the cost of Phase 1 alone of the project is in the range of $68 billion.
The aim of California’s HSR project is to link the major San Francisco Bay Area cities 
to the Central Valley and Southern California (Los Angeles/San Diego). The three major 
population centers in the Bay Area are San Francisco, San Jose and Oakland. Until the 
completion of the EIR/EIS in 2007, two major alignments – the ‘Pacheco Pass’ and the 
‘Altamont Pass’ – had been hotly advocated for by different parties to connect the Bay 
Area to the Central Valley.
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After extensive analysis of the two major alternatives (6 alignments on the Pacheco Pass 
and 11 alignments on the Altamont Pass), the 2007 EIR/EIS recommended the Pacheco 
Pass to San Francisco (via San Jose) for the proposed HSR system. The CHSRA board 
accepted the recommendation and the EIR/EIS (completed in 2007 and certified in 2008) 
selected this alternative and put an end to the debate, at least for CHSRA. At this point, it 
seemed as if the California high-speed rail project was about to take off smoothly. However, 
in recent times the project has been challenged on several fronts.
Challenges
Community Opposition: Cities along the Peninsula, from San Francisco to San Jose 
perceive the train tracks will split their communities and negatively impact their property 
values. CHSRA staff says they are conducting additional outreach to better explain need 
and impacts of the project to affected communities. The City of Orange on July 28, 2010, 
voted on a resolution to oppose the project based on worries CHSRA might use ‘eminent 
domain’ legislation to acquire land for the project. CHSRA in response issued a public 
statement voicing disappointment in the city’s unwillingness to work with them on the 
project. The statement said CHSRA will continue to reach out to residents of Orange 
County. 
Legal Challenges: Other groups have taken CHSRA to court over the EIR/EIS. Based on 
the court ruling, CHSRA rescinded the Merced-to-San Francisco section of the EIR in order 
to re-evaluate the corridor between San Jose and Gilroy where Union Pacific stated that it 
did not want to allow the HSR line to use their right-of-way. Also, general review of noise 
and vibration data is being undertaken for specific locations based on the court ruling. On 
a positive note the judge didn’t allow a restraining order on the project (the Merced to San 
Francisco Program Environmental Review was recertified identifying the same preferred 
corridor on September 3, 2010). Though there are still threats of legal action, the attorney 
general’s office has promised to defend the project.
Ridership Estimates: The University of California completed a review of the California 
HSR project ridership forecasts for the California Senate Transportation and Housing 
Committee.68 The University had strong objections about how CHSRA’s consultant, 
Cambridge Systematics, developed the ridership estimates. Some of the issues the 
University of California team had, included the fact that the survey to calibrate the model 
had a disproportionately high number of air travelers (78 percent), neglecting the nearly 
90 percent of long-distance (over 100-mile) business passenger trips that are made by car 
in California. They also questioned the way the “stated preference” survey results were 
analyzed when developing forecasts. UC felt the process used did not take into account 
the fact that travelers using different modes have different perceptions of values of travel 
time, cost, service frequency, and service reliability. They disagreed with the CS approach 
of adjusting modeling constants to replicate observed market shares for the existing travel 
modes in the year 2000 to correct the issue.
They questioned the CS changes of key parameters, such as headways after the model 
development phase, using a priori expectations, and they also did not like the fact that the 
model did not have station choices for high-speed rail stations. They felt this exaggerated 
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the importance of the Pacheco. It was their contention that if their recommended corrections 
were implemented, the ridership difference between the Pacheco and Altamont alignments 
would be minimal.
Cambridge Systematics provided a spirited response to each of the comments, pointing 
out that, in practice, adjustments need to be made to some of the theoretical constructs 
in order to arrive at credible results. In conclusion, the review team felt the issues they 
identified could significantly affect the ridership estimates, and reduce the projected 
profits, leading to the possibility of significant revenue shortfalls. The CHSRA strongly 
disagreed and pointed out that the report had not provided any analysis or estimates 
to prove this. Given that this was a review, the review team would usually not conduct 
additional analyses, so the question about the validity of estimates remains unanswered.
Project Funding and Administration: The state auditor also released a report in April 
2010 raising concerns about the ability of the Authority to raise funds for the project, 
especially the level of federal and private funding. CHSRA maintains the project plan has 
always anticipated some level of federal funding and is working with the state auditor to 
address some of the issues raised. The auditor report was followed a year later by the 
State Legislative Analyst Office69 report that raised concerns about the level of autonomy 
granted the CHSRA and its ability to manage such a large multibillion-dollar project. The 
report recommended dissolving the existing CHSRA board and bringing the project under 
Caltrans so it could benefit from Caltrans’ expertise in managing large transportation 
infrastructure projects. The same report was quick to admit that Caltrans has no expertise 
in HSR and Caltrans also may not have had experience managing such a large project 
multibillion dollar project.
The above are a few of the challenges CHSRA has faced while trying to get the actual 
project construction started.
Large infrastructure projects like HSR will negatively impact some communities and the 
environment. Opposition to such projects from those impacted is not uncommon. CHSRA 
admits to initially doing a lackluster job with outreach. They had multiple outreach firms 
that sometimes delivered conflicting messages. The program has now been brought under 
a single consultant, and, according to the Authority, this has brought more consistency and 
uniformity to their message.
SUCCESSFUL STRATEGIES
Until recently CHSRA has mainly been a planning, policy and advocacy team for HSR that 
has relied heavily on consultants to do most of any technical work. The small structure 
provided great flexibility in coordinating activities and decision making. The fact that 
appointments to the CHSRA board are made collectively by the governor, state Senate 
and state Assembly enables each of the appointees to reach and communicate with the 
political and legislative arms of government. The small size of CHSRA allowed the body to 
keep working when budget was low in certain years. More importantly, the small size of the 
organization meant critical decisions could be made quickly on short notice with minimum 
bureaucracy.
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Based on discussion with CHSRA board members and staff, some of the key factors that 
have helped them push the project so far include:
• A strategic decision was made early on to put in place formal legislation at the state 
level. This gave the HRS credibility and stability.
• The decision to operate as a separate entity was intentional, as there was 
apprehension an agency like Caltrans, which is predominantly focused on highways, 
would not devote as much attention to a mode like HSR that did not even exist in the 
US. There are still discussions about bringing the Authority under Caltrans.
• Having board members appointed by various arms of government has provided 
great leverage when there has been the need for advocacy.
• The board kept studies moving along even in years when funding was low. This 
put them in a very strong position when opportunities like the ARRA funding came 
along.
• Over the years, a strong stakeholder-support community has been developed. The 
board engages with groups like the California HSR Coalition and the Sierra Club so 
they can tap into support from their constituents if needed.
CHSRA is working feverishly to meet Notice of Determination and Record of Decision 
deadlines (by September 2011) stipulated conditions to receive the $2.34 billion from the 
ARRA stimulus package. A contract for construction has to be in place by September 2012 
as part of the requirements to obligate federal funds.
CONCLUSION
CHSRA hired a new chief executive officer in June 2010 and has begun hiring and 
expanding its staff in preparation for project construction. When the initial ARRA funds 
were allocated, it appeared that Florida was in the lead to complete the first HSR project 
in the US, but with the rejection of their funds, California may be the first to complete a 
project in the US.
The HSR scene in the US continues to be in flux. The current administration still supports 
the program, but those in opposition have also made gains, as evidenced by the decision 
of three states to return their funding. The recent accidents on China’s HSR lines will also 
taint HSR’s reputation as one of the safest modes of travel.
The review has shown building HSR will be very challenging. Even with funding in place, 
relationships with politicians, stakeholders and affected communities need to be managed 
carefully, otherwise projects could be suddenly delayed or derailed.
Other states embarking on the HSR development path can take a few lessons from 
CHSRA’s experiences:
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• Legislative Support is important: Once political support has been secured it should 
be quickly solidified with some form of written legislation at the state level, as political 
climates change frequently.
• Work hard to maintain support from all the branches of government, especially the 
legislature and executive. Any support gained must be continuously nurtured. Even 
with a legislative mandate and a shovel-ready project with almost 80 percent of 
federal funds, the Florida Orlando-to-Tampa project was still killed by a change in 
leadership that was opposed to the project.
• Continuously work to keep project studies going even when funding is low or 
prospects appear dim. In this sense, the approach adopted by California to have an 
authority made up of five members provided a low-cost body to manage the early 
stages of the project.
• It is also crucial to build support with stakeholders in the community, as they are 
indispensable advocates in generating support from the public.
• Lastly, large-scale projects like HSR will always negatively impact some members 
of the community and the environment. Mitigating and managing the impacts on 
affected communities and the environment is not a trivial task. Next to political leaders, 
impacted communities can be one of most likely agents to derail a project. The 
‘outreach’ to these communities needs to be managed carefully, and transparency 
is needed to gain the trust of those affected.
HSR has several benefits, but given the costs, careful planning, credible evaluation of 
the project and experienced managers are needed to handle such huge multibillion-dollar 
investments that involve substantial amounts of taxpayers’ money.
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ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
ARRA American Recovery and Reinvestment Act 
CHSRA California High-Speed Rail Authority
DOT Department of Transportation
FHWA Federal Highway Administration
FRA Federal Railroad Administration
HSR High-Speed Rail
ISTEA Intermodal Surface Transportation Efficiency Act
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